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Abstract 
 
This paper is the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for women’s 
subsequent earnings trajectories, distinguishing by their type of contract: permanent or fixed-
term.  Using a rich longitudinal Spanish data set from Social Security records of over 76,000 
prime-aged women strongly attached to the Spanish labor market, we find that PT work 
aggravates the segmentation of the labor market insofar there is a PT pay penalty and this 
penalty is larger and more persistent in the case of women with fixed-term contracts.  The paper 
discusses problems arising in empirical estimation (including a problem not discussed in the 
literature up to now: the differential measurement error of the LHS variable by PT status), and 
how to address them.  It concludes with policy implications relevant for Continental Europe 
and its dual structure of employment protection.   
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I. Introduction 
In the light of the recent surge in PT employment in many industrialized countries, and 
the relative concentration of women in PT jobs (making the issue a major one in gender 
equality), many researchers have increasingly become interested in analyzing the hourly 
wage differential between PT female workers and their FT counterparts and its causes.1  
To disentangle the channels through which the (raw) PT pay penalty emerges is the first 
step for designing policies which aim at improving the conditions of PT workers 
(Manning and Petrongolo, 2008).  Given the policy relevance of this line of research, it 
comes as a surprise the little attention there has been, thus far, on the differential effect 
of PT work on wages across different population subgroups, as the underlying forces 
behind the PT pay penalty may differ drastically in different labor markets leading to 
distinct policy recommendations.2 
At the same time, there is a growing concern among academics, politicians and 
practitioners, that the path of partial reforms taken by many Continental European 
countries, such as France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, over the last three 
decades of maintaining strong employment protection for regular jobs while attempting 
at establishing more flexible but marginal labor market segments has resulted in a dual 
labor market.  Thus, there has been a deepening segmentation of these labor markets 
with ‘insiders’ (those with permanent contracts), on the one side, enjoying high level of 
employment protection, decent jobs and generous benefits, and ‘outsiders’ (those with 
fixed-term contracts), on the other, having poor labor market perspectives and low 
                                                 
1 See Jones and Long, 1979; Blank, 1990; Ermisch and Wright, 1993; Montgomery and Cosgrove, 1995; 
Jepsen, 2001; Wolf, 2002; Hu and Tijdens, 2003; Rodgers, 2004; Jepsen et al., 2005; Hardoy and Schøne, 
2006; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; and Connolly and Gregory, 2009, among others. 
2 A possible explanation for this is that most studies (especially in Europe) rely on relatively small 
sample sizes of individuals who work PT making difficult the heterogeneity analysis.  We have identified 
the following exceptions: Mocan and Tekin, 2003, analyze the nonprofit sector dimension; O’Connell 
and Gash, 2003, focus on differences between skilled and unskilled workers; and Ferber and Waldfogel, 
1998; Rodgers, 2004; Booth and Wood, 2008; Hirsch, 2005; O’Dorchai et al., 2007; and Mumford and 
Smith, 2007, study the gender dimension (or focus on male workers).  
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remuneration.3  Clearly, analyzing the PT / FT hourly wage differential and 
understanding the underlying channels behind the (possible) PT penalties in these two 
segments of the labor market ought to be of most relevance from policy making in 
countries with a high share of unemployment and stringent employment protection 
legislation.4  This is the central point of this article.   
Our paper is the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for 
women’s subsequent earnings trajectories from the dual labor market employment 
protection perspective, by analyzing the PT pay penalty and its cause across two groups 
of workers, those with and without a permanent contract.  We focus on adult women 
between 24 and 45 years old and strongly attached to the Spanish labor market and use 
a rich longitudinal dataset obtained from the Social Security records that covers 
employment history from 1996 to 2006, and has only recently been available to 
researchers in Spain. 5, 6  
Our paper brings to light that PT work aggravates the segmentation of the labor 
market insofar the detrimental effects of PT work are considerably bigger and more 
persistent for workers under a fixed-term contract compared to workers with a 
permanent one.  More precisely, we find evidence of a PT penalty both in wage levels 
and in wage growth of a greater magnitude for workers with fixed-term contracts than 
those with a permanent one. After accounting for workers’ observable and 
unobservable characteristics, we find that PT women with permanent contracts have 
                                                 
3 See Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Dolado, et al., 2002; Cahuc and 
Kramarz, 2004; Beninger, 2005; Eichhorst, 2007; and Dolado, et al., 2007, among others.  
4 Note that in this paper we shall deal with two types of segmentation: (1) permanent contracts (primary) 
versus temporary contracts (secondary); and (2) FT (primary) and PT (secondary) employment. 
5 Although the data set covers employment history from 1985 to 2006, we focus our analysis on the 
1996 through 2006 period because type of contract is not available prior to 1996.  However, we shall 
use women’s employment history back to 1985 to calculate variables such as labor market experience 
and tenure. 
6 Although several papers have used longitudinal data to estimate the PT pay penalty (Blank, 1998; 
Hirsch, 2005; and Booth and Wood, 2008, among others), very few have over a decade of data 
allowing them to observe women extended labor market history (see for instance, Connolly and 
Gregory, 2009). 
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wages that are, on average, 9 log points lower and grow 2.9 log points less per year 
than wages of FT counterparts.  For women with fixed-term contracts, the PT pay 
penalty is more than twice as large, 23 log points, and wages grow 3.9 log points less 
per year than wages of FT counterparts.  To put the estimates of wage growth into 
context, their size ranges between one-and-a-half and twice the size of the estimated 
college premium on wage growth. Thanks to the richness of our dataset, our estimates 
control for workers’ socio-demographic characteristics, employer’s characteristics, 
workers’ previous employment history, and workers’ unobserved heterogeneity.  
The paper also discusses problems arising in empirical estimation, and how to 
address them.  In particular, one contribution of our paper is to uncover an empirical 
problem not discussed in the literature up to now: the differential measurement error of 
the LHS variable by PT status. We use an alternative dataset (the Time Use Survey), to 
compare contractual hours with actual hours worked and show that PT workers 
consistently work a greater number of hours in excess of contractual hours relative to 
their FT counterparts.7  The result of this measurement error in contractual hours is to 
bias upwards the hourly wages of PT workers (relative to FT workers) leading to 
underestimating the PT wage penalty.8  To address this problem, we follow two 
different strategies.  First, we use imputed effective hours to obtain an estimate of the 
PT / FT wage differential in levels.  Second, we focus our attention on the wage change 
as opposed to wage level, and drop from our sample of analysis the observations of 
wage change observed exactly when status changes.9  Assuming that differential 
measurement error by PT status is an individual-employment-status fixed-effect, our 
                                                 
7 The measurement error in contractual hours can be explained by employers having an incentive to 
underreport contractual hours to reduce total labor costs, and being able to act upon it in a much easier 
way for PT jobs (since they are less protected by the law and the unions) than for FT jobs.   
8 As our data comes for Social Security records, we use contractual monthly wages and hours to calculate 
the hourly wages. 
9 For most (96%) of our sample of individuals who switched to PT employment, we observe them several 
years in either status.  Therefore individuals’ attrition because of this restriction is practically negligible.  
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approach circumvents the problem of differential measurement effect and informs us on 
whether the PT status also implies a penalty in the subsequent growth of wages.   
Spain is a suitable case to investigate this issue because of the striking 
segmentation of its labor market.10  The Spanish unemployment rate has been 
extremely high (as much as one fifth of the labor force) for almost two decades (during 
the 1980s and 1990s), and it is currently, at 20%, the highest in Europe.  In addition, an 
important dual labor market developed after legislation changes in 1984, resulting in 
the economy with the highest rate of fixed-term contracts in Europe for the last two 
decades (over one third of all contracts are fixed-term contracts).  Finally, the issue is 
particularly timely as the Spanish Prime Minister, following other industrialized 
countries’ practices, is proposing to promote the use of PT work to fight 
unemployment, arguing that it will add flexibility in the labor market.  
This paper is closer to Connolly and Gregory, 2009, (hereafter, CG) in that it 
examines the implications of switching to PT work for women’s subsequent earnings 
trajectories using a long unbalanced panel and a fixed-effects `within´ estimator 
approach.  Methodologically, our work differs from CG study in the following three 
ways: First, we estimate the differential PT pay penalty by type of contract.  Second, 
we are able to distinguish between the PT pay penalty and the `motherhood pay gap´, as 
our data contains information on children in the household (whereas CG cannot 
distinguish between mothers and non-mothers).  Third, we identify and address a 
methodological issue regarding differential measurement error in the dependent 
variable.  While our findings for the primary labor market are consistent with those 
found by Connolly and Gregory, 2008 and 2009, and Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, in 
the UK and Hirsch, 2005, in the US, our work brings to light that in addition to the 
                                                 
10 See for instance, Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1994; Adam, 1996; Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Galdón-
Sánchez and Güell, 2003; and Güell and Petrongolo, 2007, among others. 
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conventional channels behind the PT penalty, workers from the secondary labor market 
suffer a further unexplained loss due to the PT status switch itself, in addition to 
experiencing negative returns to PT work.11 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents an overview of the 
literature.  Section III describes the Spanish economic and institutional background.  
Section IV presents the data and the descriptive statistics.  Section V explains the 
methodological approach, analyzes the results, and discusses sensitivity analyses.  
Section VI concludes with a discussion on policy implications. An additional 
Appendix, which can be find in the authors’ web page, provides further information on 
the data and detailed results on the sensitivity analyses. 
 
II. Literature on PT Earnings Penalty 
Many researchers have increasingly become interested in analyzing the hourly wage 
differential between PT female workers and their FT counterparts.  While the earliest 
studies focused on the US (Jones and Long, 1979; Blank, 1990) and the UK (Ermisch 
and Wright, 1993), the more recent literature has evaluated the PT pay penalty in many 
industrialized countries, such as Australia (Rodgers, 2004), Belgium (Jepsen, 2001; and 
Jepsen et al., 2005), Norway (Hardoy and Schøne, 2004), The Netherlands (Hu and 
Tijdens, 2003); and West Germany (Wolf, 2002), among others.  Most studies find a 
negative unadjusted PT wage gap (a PT pay penalty), the magnitude of which differs 
substantially across the different countries.  In some studies—such as, Rodgers, 2004; 
Jepsen, 2001; Jepsen et al., 2005; Hardoy and Schøne, 2004; Muñoz de Bustillo 
Llorente et al., 2008; and Manning and Petrongolo, 2008—, the PT pay penalty 
vanishes or becomes small when controlling for differences in workers and job 
                                                 
11 In the primary labor market, we find that the PT penalty is fully explained by the change of employer, 
negligible returns to PT work experience, and job characteristics. 
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characteristics (especially education and occupation).  In other studies (Gallie et al., 
1998; Gornich and Jacobs, 1996; Rosenfeld and Kalleberg, 1990), a wage gap remains 
and this unexplained part also shows considerable cross-country variation.  Finally, in a 
third group of studies, a PT pay premium is found (Booth and Wood, 2008; Pissarides 
et al., 2005; and Pagán Rodríguez, 2007).12   
While some of the differences in the results are explained by countries’ 
institutional and cultural differences, and the amount of information available on 
workers, jobs, and labor market characteristics in the different datasets used; several 
identification problems within this literature are difficult to overcome.  Most of this 
literature compares the hourly wages of PT female workers with those of FT female 
workers after controlling for all observable characteristics, acknowledging that 
unobserved heterogeneity may still prevail, as women deciding to work PT may have 
different tastes and preferences about work than do women who work FT.  As Hakim, 
1997, explains, while some women are committed to careers in the labor market, a 
second group of women are qualitatively different since they give priority to their 
domestic roles and activities, do not invest in what economists term ‘human capital’ 
even if they acquire education qualifications, transfer quickly and permanently to part-
time work as soon as a breadwinner husband permits it, choose undemanding jobs 
‘with no worries or responsibilities’ when they do work, and are hence found 
concentrated in lower paid and lower grade jobs which offer convenient working hours 
with which they [are] satisfied. (p. 43).  If there are unobserved quality differences 
between PT and FT workers, results from cross-sectional studies of the PT wage effect 
will reflect an omitted variable bias.  Nevertheless, many of the studies on the PT wage 
effect have been estimated on cross-sectional samples—see, for example, Simpson, 
                                                 
12 A detailed discussion on the few studies that have analyzed the PT hourly wage differential in Spain 
can be found in the next section, which describes the Spanish economic and institutional background 
(Section III) and in the results section (Section V.1). 
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1986; Blank, 1990; and Hotchkiss, 1991; Ermisch and Wright, 1993; Rodgers, 2004; 
Pagán Rodríguez, 2007; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; Mumford and Smith, 2008, 
among others.   
One way to address the unobserved heterogeneity problem is to use panel data 
and to estimate a fixed-effects-‘within’ estimator, in which case, the effect of PT on 
wages is identified through those workers who switch status (see Booth and Wood, 
2008; and Connolly and Gregory, 2009).13  While having important advantages, 
longitudinal analysis is not without shortcomings.  A frequent problem arises when 
there is a small sample size of switchers, especially due to the infrequent transitions 
between FT to PT work and vice-versa, questioning the external validity of the results.  
In addition, measurement errors of hours and wages, which are common in this 
literature (Altonji 1986; Bound et al., 2001), bias OLS estimates towards zero and 
magnify the attenuation bias in a fixed-effects context (Aaronson and French, 2004; 
Manning and Petrongolo, 2008).  
Given that most studies use worker’ survey data, measurement errors of key 
variables is a frequent concern in this literature.  For instance, the OECD, 2002, warns 
about the possibility of having measurement errors in the survey stemming from the 
fact that the interviewed persons provide direct information about their own wages, 
rather than their employers, as is the case with matched employer-employee data or 
social security records.  Others have raised similar concerns (see for instance, 
Pissarides et al., 2005; Mocan and Tekin, 2003; or Buligescu et al., 2009).  Most 
recently, Buligescu et al., 2009, find that reported actual working hours, which are 
usually observed only for one week, show considerable dispersion and are likely to 
induce spurious negative correlation between working hours and the calculated wage 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, Hirsch, 2005, uses multiple short panels with two observations per worker (one year 
apart) to estimate the effect of switching between FT and PT status on wage changes.   
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rate.  They argue that it is better to use contractual hours as they do not tend to vary as 
much from week to week.  Some efforts to reduce the effect of measurement error in 
reported hours worked (and consequently PT status) include instrumenting such 
variables with their lags.  However, the results indicate that the instruments do not 
always seem to work as they are fairly similar to OLS estimates for some of the 
countries (Pissarides et al., 2005). 
Another important identification problem is the danger of reverse causation: 
maybe it is low wages that ‘cause’ PT work, not PT work that ‘causes’ low wages.  
This problem is usually addressed by using an instrumental variables strategy.  
However, for this technique to work well requires a variable that affects propensity to 
work PT but does not have a direct effect on earnings.  Unfortunately, such a variable is 
extremely difficult to find.  And albeit children and marital status are frequently used as 
variables affecting the decision to work PT but not the wages earned—see Ermisch and 
Wright, 1993; Blank, 1998; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, among others—, it is well 
established in this literature that “this is a very strong assumption that may not, in 
reality, be any better than the exogeneity assumption that this is supposed to replace” 
(Manning and Petrongolo, page F33, Economic Journal 2008).  Aaronson and French, 
2004, are the only ones that we know of to use an alternative instrument for worked 
hours, the work disincentive of the Social Security system.  They are able to isolate 
exogenous shifts into PT employment resulting from changes in Social Security rules 
for older males.14  
                                                 
14 At ages 62 and 65, individuals face incentives to reduce their work hours.  During their sample period, 
most individuals age 62 and older are eligible for social security benefits but face an earnings test until 
age 69. Above the social security earnings test threshold level, individuals face a high marginal tax rate 
on earnings. Between ages 62 and 64, benefits lost through the earnings test are replaced in the form of 
higher benefits in the future, resulting in about a dollar of higher benefits in present value in the future for 
every dollar lost through the earnings test. However, if individuals are liquidity constrained, it may not be 
until age 62, when the early retirement provision of the social security rules applies, that they will have 
sufficient financial resources to reduce their work hours. After age 65, benefits lost through the social 
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In our paper, we account for worker unobserved heterogeneity by exploiting a 
rich longitudinal dataset that covers employment history from 1985 to 2006, and has 
only recently been available to researchers in Spain.  In addition, as our data comes for 
Social Security records, we use contractual monthly wages and hours to calculate the 
hourly wages, eliminating the problem of measurement error due to recall bias or non-
response.  We do not model selection into PT employment.  Therefore, we do not 
strictly identify the causal impact on wages or wage growth of working PT.  However, 
considering that longitudinal estimates more closely approximate average treatment 
effects among the treated than among random draws from the population (Hirsch, 
2005), we believe that our estimates address some of the issues raised in this literature 
and bring new evidence on the situation of PT workers in segmented labor markets in 
general, and in Spain, more specifically.  
 
III. Economic and Institutional Background  
Most of the existing literature on PT employment uses data from the Netherlands, UK, 
US, or Australia where PT accounts for a very high percentage of overall female 
employment and where the incidence of female temporary or fixed-term employment is 
relatively low.  Table 1 shows statistics for some of these countries and illustrates that 
Spain is among the countries with a lower incidence of PT work combined with an 
extremely high incidence of fixed-term employment (OECD, 2008).  These figures 
highlight that the role of PT employment in Spain may differ given the unique 
specificities of its labor market.  Below, we discuss the institutional background on PT 
and fixed-term employment in Spain. 
                                                                                                                                               
security earnings test result in only small increases in future benefits. Therefore, the social security 
earnings test results in a strong incentive to reduce work hours by age 65. 
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The two most common forms of flexible work arrangements (fixed-term contracts 
and PT work) have evolved quite differently in Spain over the last two decades.  Both 
types of contracts were first regulated by law in 1984 with the objective of adding 
flexibility and promoting employment in a rigid labor market with stringent 
employment protection legislation and high levels of unemployment.  While fixed-term 
employment soared, the growth in PT employment was modest, at most.  As a result, 
since the early 1990s, fixed-term employment represents one third of the Spanish labor 
force (by far, the highest share among European countries), whereas the share of PT 
employment is below one tenth of the labor force (far from the EU average of 18%).   
Fixed-Term Contracts 
Prior to 1984, most contracts in Spain were permanent contracts.  With such contracts, 
the costs of dismissing a worker were high (up to 45 days of wages per year worked if 
the worker appealed to Court and the dismissal was declared “unfair”, with a limit of 24 
months’ wages).15  In 1984, in a context of high unemployment and given that an 
across-the-board reduction of dismissal costs was politically unfeasible, the use of 
temporary contracts was liberalized.  As such, fixed-term contracts for regular activities 
entailed much lower severance payments than permanent contracts (initially of 12 days 
per year worked, zero if the firm waited until expiration), and their termination could 
not be appealed to labor courts (in contrast with their permanent counterpart). However, 
temporary contracts could only be used up to a maximum of three consecutive years.   
The surge of fixed-term contracts began to be questioned in the late-1980s when 
experts started to advise against the risk of segmentation with “good” (permanent) jobs 
and “bad” (fixed-term) jobs—Segura et al., 1991; Bentolila and Dolado, 1992; Jimeno 
and Toharia, 1993; and Dolado et al., 2002.  The concern was that the Spanish labor 
                                                 
15 Izquierdo and Lacuesta, 2006, and Galdón-Sánchez and Güell, 2003, estimate that between 72% and 
75% of cases that arrived to court were declared “unfair” by Spanish judges. 
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market would become a dual labor market with workers with fixed-term contracts 
holding unstable, low protected and poorly paid jobs, while workers with indefinite 
contracts enjoyed protection and presumably also higher wages.  According to Bover 
and Gómez, 2004, between 1985 and 1994, over 95% of all new hires were employed 
through temporary contracts and the conversion rate from temporary to permanent 
contracts was only around 10%.16 
The reforms of 1994, 1997, 1999, and 2001 aimed to enhance the use of 
permanent contracts and reduce its cost.  While the 1994 reform tried to limit the use of 
temporary contracts through ineffective regulation, the more recent reforms increased 
the incentives for firms to hire workers in certain population groups using permanent 
contracts.17,18  However, these reforms were quite unsuccessful at reducing the share of 
temporary contracts in the labor force—see Kugler et al., 2002, and Dolado et al., 
2002.  Moreover, Güell and Petrongolo, 2007, find that the conversion rate of fixed-
term contracts into permanent ones has decreased over time, as it has gone down from 
18% in 1987 to 5% in 1996, reflecting the fact that employers use fixed-term contracts 
more as a flexible device to adjust employment in the face of adverse shocks than as 
stepping stones towards permanent jobs.  Consistent with this finding, Dolado et al., 
2002, find that a large fraction of temporary workers have been hired under fixed-term 
contracts while other types of temporary contracts (probationary or seasonal jobs), 
which are more representative in other European labor markets, have remained 
                                                 
16 Once workers have a permanent contract, they will rarely switch to a temporary one, unless they 
become unemployed.  For example, in our dataset women that have a permanent contract at t have a 
probability of 96.9% of having a permanent contract at t+1 if they continue to be employed. 
17 In 1994 new regulations limited the use of temporary employment contracts to seasonal jobs.  In 
practice, employers found ways to get around this restriction and continued to hire workers under 
temporary contracts for all types of jobs and not just for seasonal jobs.  
18 For instance the 1997 reform reduced unfair dismissal costs by about 25% and payroll taxes between 
40% and 90% for newly signed permanent contracts for workers under 30 years of age, over 45 years of 
age, the long-term unemployed, women under-represented in their occupations, and disabled workers.  In 
addition, this reform reduced unfair dismissal costs by about 45% and payroll taxes by 50% for 
conversions of temporary into permanent contracts for all age groups. 
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relatively unimportant in Spain.  These authors also find that, since the regulation of 
fixed-term contracts in Spain in 1984, worker and job turnover have increased 
considerably.  Not surprisingly, several authors have found that the likelihood of 
transiting into unemployment is considerably higher among workers with fixed-term 
contracts than those with permanent ones (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007; García-Ferreira 
and Villanueva, 2007; and Barceló and Villanueva, 2010).  As such, Barceló and 
Villanueva, 2010, estimate that for a given year the probability of entering an 
unemployment spell is 8 percentage points higher for workers with fixed-term contracts 
(10%) than those with permanent ones (2%).  Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000, also finds that 
temporary work spells in Spain are unlikely to end in permanent jobs, regardless of 
workers’ tenure, and that temporary work is more likely to become a trap than a bridge 
to permanent employment.  Another piece of evidence suggesting that the labor market 
of temporary workers is a secondary labor market in Spain is provided by Dolado et al., 
1999, who estimate that the probability of receiving free or subsided on-the-job training 
was 22% lower for workers under fixed-term contracts than for workers under 
permanent contracts, and by Jimeno and Toharia, 1996, who also suggest that 
temporary employment increases work accidents, which happen to be three times larger 
for workers under fixed-term contracts than for workers under permanent contracts.  
Finally, Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000, also provides evidence that temporary contracts are 
less desirable then permanent ones in Spain.  This author estimates that 85% of 
temporary workers in Spain in 1996 are involuntarily holding a temporary job because 
of their inability to find a permanent job.  In addition, she finds that only 0.4% of 
temporary workers claim that they have been seeking a temporary job. 
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Part-Time Work 
PT work in Spain has traditionally been a second-best job because of its unfortunate 
regulation.  Prior to the 1980s, PT work in Spain heavily penalized workers in terms of 
higher social security costs and was only legal for certain types of workers considered 
at-risk of social exclusion, such as disabled workers, first time job seekers, workers 
over 40 years of age or with family responsibilities, and the long-term unemployed.  
The 1980 Worker’s Act (Estatuto del Trabajador) removed the social security costs’ 
penalty, and the 1984 reform eliminated the hiring restrictions and legalized (for the 
first time) the conversion from FT to PT contracts.  However despite these changes, PT 
employment remained modest, hovering around 5% of the labor force.  It is not until 
the mid-1990s with the economic crisis and the 1994 reform that aimed at increasing 
PT work as a flexible work arrangement by reducing the social rights of some PT 
workers (those working less than 12 hours per week or less than 48 hours per month), 
that PT employment rose to 8% of the labor force.  Four years later, the 1994 changes 
were undone as the Spanish PT regulation converged to that of the EU, but PT 
remained stable around 9% of the labor force--and far from the EU average. 
PT work is not only less frequent among female workers in Spain than in the 
neighboring European countries, but it is also less stable.  For instance, Buddelmeyer et 
al., 2005, estimate a year-to-year transition matrix between different employment status 
and find that only half of women working PT in Spain, over the 1994 through 1999 
period, remain in such status one year later—compared to 72% on average in the EU-11 
countries.  Where are the rest of the PT women one year later? According to 
Buddelmeyer et al., 2005, in Spain one fifth end up working FT, another one fifth end 
up out of the labor force and the other one tenth enter unemployment.19  These figures 
                                                 
19 Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente et al., 2008, find similar results for the period 1987 through 1995. 
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contrast sharply with those from the EU-11 average where 14% move to FT work, 11% 
leave the labor force and 3% enter unemployment, and raise caution into seeing PT jobs 
as stepping stone into good jobs in Spain as 35% of women working PT exit 
employment within a year (compared to only 14% in the EU-11).  Consistent with these 
findings, Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2010, find that less than one fourth 
of the PT employment spells that initiate from non-work (defined as unemployed or out 
of the labor force) end with FT employment over the 1996 through 2006 period, while 
the other 75% end up exiting employment.20   These authors find that 86% of all PT 
spells over this period initiated from non-work, whereas only 14% originate from FT 
work (of which 8% went into PT and back to FT, and the other 6% transitioned from 
FT work to PT to out of work.) 
Further evidence supports the hypothesis that those in PT in Spain are in 
secondary employment.  PT workers are more likely to be working under a temporary 
contract than a permanent one.  For instance, pooling Labor Force Survey (LFS) data 
from 1999 to 2009, we find that the likelihood of having a fixed-term contract almost 
doubled for PT workers than for FT ones (52,19% versus 28,67%).  Alternatively Table 
2 shows that PT work is much more frequent among fixed-term contracts than 
permanent ones, both for males and females.  For instance, while the share of women 
with fixed-term contract that work PT doubles that of women with permanent contract 
(29.85% compared to 15.67%), for males this likelihood is more than four times as big 
(6.77% compared to 1.45%).  Moreover, similar to other countries, PT work is 
concentrated among certain industries—especially services, such as, retail sales, 
janitors, real state, restaurants, education, and other social and personal services—, and 
                                                 
20 The average PT spell for these workers was 16 months for those who end up in FT work and 10 months 
for those who end up exiting employment.  
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low-skilled occupations, such as non-qualified occupations or non-professional white-
collar jobs (Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente et al., 2008). 
Another characteristic of PT work in Spain is that it is highly involuntary. The 
Spanish LFS asks workers the reasons for working part-time.  Using pooled data from 
the 1999 through 2009 LFS, we find that more than half of PT workers (52.66% of 
women and 58.64% of men working PT) are doing so involuntarily, either because they 
could not find a full-time job (27.88% of women and 28.25% of men), or because the 
type of work activity they were engaged in required such an arrangement (24.78% of 
women and 30.39% of men).  While 40% of women and 32.37% of men working PT 
reported doing so voluntarily, the reasons they gave differed by gender.21  As many as 
22.09% of women working PT (but only 2.35% of their male counterparts) reported 
choosing such an arrangement because of family reasons.  In contrast, 17.91% of 
women and 30.02% of men reported choosing to work PT because they were studying, 
were sick, or had some other type of disability.  To put these numbers into context and 
allow comparison with other European countries, we have used the 2005 Work 
Orientations module from the Social Survey Program(ISSP) to estimate the percentage 
of workers who would prefer a FT job, by PT/FT status. The estimates, shown in Figure 
1, are striking.  While in Nordic, Liberal or Continental Europe less than one fourth of 
workers in PT jobs would prefer working FT, in Spain almost two thirds of FT workers 
would prefer to have a FT job. 
It is also worthwhile to explore whether the voluntariness into PT work varies 
not only by gender, but also by type of contract.  Table 3 explores this issue using the 
1999-2009 Labor Force Survey data.  Table 3 shows that the share of involuntary PT 
work (either because they could not find a FT job or because their job required them to 
                                                 
21 A small fraction of PT workers either did not respond to this question. 
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do so) is larger among fixed-term contracts than permanent ones, and that this is 
specially so for women.  For instance, while the proportion of women involuntarily 
working PT is 17 percentage points greater for those with a fixed-term contract 
(65.11%) than for those with a permanent one (47.93%), this difference is only 4 
percentage points greater among males (62.99% versus 59.26%).  Another interesting 
finding from Table 3 is that the fraction of women working PT because of family 
reasons (that is, taking care of their children or an elderly) is more than three times 
higher for women with permanent contracts (28.60%) versus a fixed-term ones 
(12.48%), suggesting that while PT work may be a cultural choice in the primary labor 
market, it is not necessarily so in the secondary market. 
As explained with more details in Section IV, in our analysis we shall focus on 
women strongly attached to the labor force to reduce a potential problem with PT 
voluntariness due to non-market responsibilities.  In addition, the Appendix also 
presents the analysis by whether the women have family responsibilities (measured by 
presence of children in the household) or not, to explore whether our results are driven 
mainly by mothers.  As explained, our results are robust to such analysis.   
Feminization of These Types of Work Arrangements 
In Spain, women are over-represented in both types of work arrangements, part-
time and fixed-term.  According to the 1999 through 2009 Labor Force Survey, we find 
that 33.62% of contracts among women in Spain are fixed-term compared to 29.34% 
among men, and 20.54% of women work in PT jobs compared to 3.20% of men.  While 
women’s role in home production may imply that women have stronger preferences 
than men for PT jobs, this does not necessarily imply gender differences for fixed-term 
contracts (as a permanent contract is at least as desirable as a temporary one, given that 
it would commit the firm rather than the worker to costly procedures in case of 
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separation).  Using data from the 1994 through 1999 waves of the European 
Community Household Panel Survey, Pissarides et al., 2005, find evidence suggesting 
that the unequal allocation of genders across fixed-term contracts and PT work in Spain 
stems from employer discrimination as opposed to workers’ comparative advantage.  
They find that, after controlling for comparative advantages by conditioning the 
likelihood of being in involuntary PT work on human capital and family characteristics, 
single women in Spain are 10 percentage points more likely to be involuntary PT 
workers than single men.  Similarly, they find that fixed-term contracts are 4 percentage 
points more frequent among single women than single men in Spain, and that strong 
family ties reinforces this tendency, with married women with children being about 9 
percentage points more likely than married men to hold a fixed-term contract.  In 
addition, exploring workers’ preferences, these authors do not find evidence that 
women are particularly happier (or less unhappy) than men on PT jobs or with fixed-
term contracts, as they find that PT jobs (fixed-term contracts) in Spain tend to reduce 
both males’ and females’ overall job satisfaction by 16% (25%).22   
Evidence of Wage Differentials for these Types of Work Arrangement 
The evidence on wage differences by type of contract or PT status has been scarce in 
Spain (mainly due to the lack of large databases containing individual information on 
wages until recently), and based on cross-sectional analysis.  Given that wages are set 
by collective agreements and that these do not allow workers to be paid differently 
because of type of contract, it seems reasonable to think that employers do not 
discriminate against workers by type of contract.  Despite this fact, several empirical 
studies find that permanent workers earn around 10% more, for men, and about 5% 
more, for women, after controlling for observed heterogeneity in personal and job-
                                                 
22 While many studies from developed countries find a preference for part-time work among women 
(Booth and van Ours. 2008 ; Gregory and Connolly, 2008 ; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004), no 
such effect is found in East Germany or France (Clark and Senik, 2006) or Honduras (López et al., 2009).  
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related characteristics and for selection into type of contract (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993; 
Hernanz, 2002; and De la Rica, 2004).  Moreover, there is evidence that workers with 
fixed-term contracts segregate into low-paying firms and occupations (De la Rica, 
2004).  According to Dolado et al., 2002, “the previous evidence also points out that 
the wage gap is associated with the fact that employers tend to ‘under classify’ 
temporary workers in the occupational categories probably to cut total labor costs in 
view of the higher wage-pressure on permanent contracts caused by union pressure. 
Therefore, although temporary workers may be doing a similar job, their wages are 
lower than those of similar workers with permanent contracts.” 
Turning to the evidence on PT / FT wage differential, the evidence on wage 
differences between PT and FT workers in Spain has found that there is an 
‘unexpected’ (in the light of the anecdotal evidence and job satisfaction indicators) 
wage premium to working PT (Pagán Rodríguez, 2007), or no effect (Pissarides et al., 
2005, and Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente et al., 2008).  However, failure of correcting for 
unobserved heterogeneity and measurement problems raise caution before taking these 
estimates at face value—as acknowledged by Pissarides et al., 2005—, and explained 
with more details in Section V. 
 
IV. The Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We use data from the 2006 wave of the Continuous Sample of Working Histories 
(hereafter CSWH), which is a 4% non-stratified random sample of the population 
registered with the Social Security Administration in 2006.23  The CSWH consists of 
nearly 1.1 million individuals and provides the complete labor market history of the 
                                                 
23 This includes any person that has either contributed to the Social Security or has received a pension or 
unemployment benefits from the Social Security during 2006. These data are extracted from 
administrative records from the Social Security, the Municipal Registry of Inhabitants, and the Spanish 
Internal Revenue Service.  For a description of the CSWH and the sampling strategy, see Argimón and 
González, 2006. 
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selected individuals back to 1967.24  It provides information on: (1) socio-demographic 
characteristics of the worker (such as, sex, education, nationality, province of residence, 
number of children in the household and their date of birth); (2) worker’s job 
information (such as, the type of contract—fixed-term versus permanent contract—, the 
PT status, the occupation, and the dates the employment spell started and ended, and 
the monthly earnings);  (3) employer’s information (such as, industry—defined at the 
three-digits Spanish classification code or NACE—, public versus private sector—, the 
number of workers in the firm, and the location—at the province level).  Although not 
reported in the CSWH, other variables such as working experience (in FT and PT work) 
and tenure can be easily calculated.  In addition, information on the individual’s 
education level, and the number and date of birth of children living in the household at 
the time of the interview (including own natural, adopted, step and foster children) is also 
available in the Spanish Municipal Registry of Inhabitants, which is matched at the 
person level with the Social Security records. 
Because the CSWH does not have reliable information on type of contract prior 
to 1996, our analysis focuses on the years 1996 to 2006.  However, we use information 
back to 1967 to calculate variables such as workers’ experience and tenure.  Therefore, 
although our PT penalty analysis focuses on work histories from 1996 to 2006, we use 
information on the workers’ employment experience (in FT and PT) and tenure back to 
1985. 
Following CG, we restrict our sample to women whose full labor market history 
to date can be observed.  We focus our analysis on wage and salary workers, that is, we 
                                                 
24 We have information on the dates the employment spell started and ended, but for those not working 
we do not know whether this is because they are studying, they are unemployed or another reason (the 
unemployed appear as such in the dataset only as long as they receive unemployment benefits from the 
Social Security but not if they are not eligible for such benefits). .  Therefore, we record spells of non-
work as the time the person is not employed.   
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exclude from the analysis self-employed individuals.25  We confine our selection to 
birth cohorts between 1961 and 1978.  In addition, we restrict women in our sample to 
be aged between 24 and 45 years.  The reason for dropping women younger than 24 
years old is that we want to eliminate part-time work by students.  In addition, we 
confine our analysis to women living in households of five or fewer members (96.5% 
of the sample).  The reason for restricting our attention to women 45 and younger living 
in households of five or fewer members is that we want to have accurate information on 
the number and age of children, which is unavailable in the CSWH but can be obtained 
from the information about the household composition as reported by the Spanish 
Municipal Registry of Inhabitants.26  Finally, because we want to confine the analysis 
to women with a strong attachment to the labor force, we further restrict our sample to 
women who record at least three years in wage and salary work after having worked at 
least one year FT (this is the same restriction as the one used by CG).27    
This sample selection results in an unbalanced panel of 591,063 observations on 
76,025 women, of which 16,469 (21.66%) are observed working PT at some point in 
                                                 
25 If the worker held more than one job, the analysis focuses on her main job, defined as the job in which 
the worker has a permanent contract—if she has one—, and in the case of multiple jobs with the same 
type of contract, the one for which the individual worked the largest number of days in a given year.  
26 Although we know who lives in the household and their age, we do not know their relationship with 
the respondent in the CSWH.  According to Lacuesta and Fernandez-Kranz, 2009, the information on 
family composition is reliable (relative to Census data) for the sub-population of women under 45 years 
old and for those living in small households.  However, for older women and for women living in large 
households, the data becomes noisier as it is unclear whether the younger person in the household is a 
descendent or just a roommate. 
27 By doing so, we reduce the possibility that our results are driven by the fact that PT workers are mainly 
poorly skilled workers who have difficulties remaining employed.  To verify this, we compared the 
descriptive statistics of women strongly attached to the labor force (the sample used in the paper) to the 
same population prior to applying the restriction of strongly attached to the labor force (tables available 
from authors upon request).  As expected, the restriction of “strongly attached to the labor force” 
eliminated a large fraction of part-timers—as many as 46% (45%) of women working with a permanent 
(fixed-term) contract in 2006—, compared to the fraction of full-timers that was dropped—3% and 16% 
of women working with a permanent and a fixed-term contract, respectively.  Moreover, restricting the 
sample to those women strongly attached to the labor force raised the average education level of the 
women in the sample (especially among those who were working PT), lead to higher average experience 
levels and increased the proportion of women in white-collar jobs and in the manufacturing and trade 
sectors (while reducing the proportion of women working in the services sectors or the proportion of 
immigrant workers).  Finally, the labor-force-attachment restriction lead to higher average wages (despite 
the fact that women fully attached to the labor force were younger). 
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time between 1996 and 2006 as shown in Table 4.  The percentage of women who 
switch to PT at some point in time is higher if they are working with a fixed-term 
contract (28.13%) than if they are working with a permanent contract (18.68%).  
Although our econometric analysis focuses on the time period between 1996 and 2006, 
individuals are in the CSWH between 3 and 21 years, and for an average of 8 years.    
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the key covariates for the year 2006.  
The main focus of the present study is to analyze how the hourly wage trajectories vary 
by FT status and by contract type (fixed-term versus permanent).  The data are 
therefore divided in four groups, classified by FT status and type of contract.28  
Following most of the European literature, we classify a worker working PT if she 
works 30 hours or less each week, and FT if she works 31 or more hours each week.  
Among the sample under study, we find that those with permanent contracts represent 
about two thirds of the sample.  In addition, the percentage of women working in PT 
employment moves around one tenth of the sample, with a slightly higher share among 
those women working with fixed-term contracts (11% versus 9%).   
When comparing the variables for women working in PT versus FT jobs, Table 
5 shows that PT workers have lower (raw) hourly wages and their (raw) hourly wage 
grows at a lower rate than FT workers.29  However, this cannot be used as a reliable 
estimate of the pay penalty that a given woman would suffer if she changed from FT to 
PT status because women working PT are very different from those working FT, as 
found in the subsequent rows of this table.  For instance, we observe that PT workers 
are less-educated, older and more likely to have children of all ages than FT workers.  
Looking at employer differences across the two groups, women in PT employment are 
                                                 
28 Although one individual can appear under different categories in different waves of the panel, it should 
be noted that these four categories are mutually exclusive.   
29 Our measure of pay is hourly earnings, calculated as annual earnings excluding overtime divided by 
total contractual hours, deflated by the 2006 price deflator. 
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concentrated in the private sector, smaller firms and blue-collar occupations (relative to 
FT workers). These findings suggest that PT workers may segregate into low-paying 
firms and low-paying jobs.  Finally, the years of experience into FT and PT work 
highlight that there is high persistence into both FT / PT status—this result has also 
been found in other countries by Blank, 1998; Buddelmeyer et al., 2005; and Connolly 
and Gregory, 2008, and 2009.  Overall the observed differences for PT versus FT 
workers hold across the two types of contract.30   
Compared to other datasets, our data has several advantages.  First, the CSWH 
is a very large sample, which is important because PT work and switching from FT to 
PT (and vice-versa) is a relatively infrequent event, and more so when we focus the 
analysis on women strongly attached to the labor market.  Second, the CSWH provides 
the complete labor market history for those women registered in the Social Security 
Administration in 2006, for up to 21 years.  Although the restriction that information on 
type of contract is available reduces the length of women’s earnings trajectories to up to 
ten years, it is still a non-negligible length of time.  Third, it contains reliable 
information on monthly earnings, tenure, experience in FT and PT work, and change of 
employer, as the information comes directly from the payroll records.  Measurement 
error due to recall bias or self-reporting for these key variables is minimized with this 
data set.  Similarly, non-response is not an issue.  Fourth, the dataset has rich 
information on individual characteristics, including education, age, ethnicity, marital 
status, and number and age of children in the household. 
One of the short-comings of the CSWH is that it contains only information on 
individuals working in the formal sector.  While Izquierdo et al., 2010 find that, 
compared to the Labor Force Survey, these dataset offers an accurate picture of the 
                                                 
30 It is worth highlighting that women with a fixed-term contract have much less in the way of FT 
employment experience than those on FT or PT permanent contracts. 
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formal sector in Spain, Ramos Muñoz, 2007, find that some differences exists for 
youth, females and foreigners due to the fact that the CSWH does not account for the 
informal sector.  For this to be a problem in our study, we would need to argue that the 
incidence of the informal sector is greater among PT workers than FT workers, which 
seems plausible.  Unfortunately, there is little we can do about this.  That said, it is 
important to keep in mind that the bulk of our analysis focuses on the time period 1996 
through 2006, which was mainly a period of economic expansion, reducing the 
relevance of the informal sector.  Most importantly, our analysis focuses on women 
strongly attached to the labor force (and these women tend to work in the formal sector 
of the economy). 
 
V. Methodology and Results  
Our objective is to exploit longitudinal data in Spain to analyze the direct consequences 
of PT employment on subsequent earnings, earnings growth, and career trajectories.  
Because of the striking segmentation of the Spanish labor market, we analyze the PT 
penalty by type of contract and explore the effectiveness of job protection into reducing 
the potential PT penalty. 
 
V.1. PT log hourly wage differential 
We begin our analysis by estimating the average effect of working PT on the hourly 
wage level.  Table 6 presents our estimates using a variety of approaches.  For ease of 
the exposition, we use a simple dummy variable approach to measure the log hourly 
wage differences associated with PT status, conditional on controls.31  We begin by 
estimating the following equation using pooled OLS:  
                                                 
31 This approach is similar to the one used by Hirsch, 2005; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, and CG, 
among others.  Earnings function parameters differ between PT and FT status, but the gaps in the wage 
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(1) itiititit PTXLnW µφθβ +++=  
Here, itLnW  is the natural log of real hourly earnings of individual i at year t; itX  is a 
vector of individual and job characteristics for individual i at time t, with β the 
corresponding coefficient vector (including an intercept).  Because there has been much 
debate on whether variables that control for employer characteristics or change in 
occupation or employers ought to be included in the specification (see discussion 
below), we present alternative specifications to evaluate the robustness of the results.  
itPT  is a binary variable equal to one if the worker’s principal job is PT in year t.  The 
error term includes both a random component µit with mean zero and constant variance, 
and a worker-specific fixed effect iφ .  All regressions use the Huber/White estimator of 
variance and allow for observations not being independent within cluster-individuals.  
Regression (1) is estimated for the whole sample (panel A), and separately for workers 
with a fixed-term contract (panel B) and those with a permanent contract (panel C).   
While it is true that our specifications do not account for selection by type of 
contract and by PT status, by controlling for the number and age of children and 
education, on the one hand, and employer characteristics, on the other, we are de facto 
controlling for the same information that many researchers have controlled for when 
using an instrumental variable approach correction.  In the case of selection into FT/PT 
employment, most researchers use family composition variables to identify 
participation into PT employment (Blank, 1998; Pissarides et al., 2005) arguing that 
these variables do not explain wages.32   Similarly, in the case of selection by type of 
contract, researchers use employer’s characteristics, such as private versus public sector 
                                                                                                                                               
estimated using the dummy variable approach differ little from those based on separate equations by PT 
status, and evaluated at the means. 
32 To identify participation into PT work in Spain, Pagán Rodríguez, 2007, uses age, level of education, 
marital status, number of children 5 years old or younger, number of children between 6 and 12 years old, 
region and household income.  He finds evidence of sample selection among women working PT (but not 
among those working FT).   
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or firm size.33  We find the assumption that these variables explain participation but not 
wages (or wage growth in the next section) difficult to believe and, therefore, prefer 
using the information directly in the wage equation, acknowledging that selection into 
the different types of jobs cannot be corrected, although unobserved heterogeneity is 
accounted for with the fixed-effects specification.  Also, as discussed in the Section 
V.3, we have addressed the issue of endogeneity of type of contract implementing two 
alternative IVs commonly used in the Spanish literature and have found that overall our 
results are robust to such correction (see Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5). 
Analyzing first the pooled OLS estimates for the whole sample (first row of panel 
A), the estimate headed “unadjusted” shows that the log hourly earnings of PT women 
are, on average, 11 log points less than the log hourly earnings of FT women.  The 
subsequent columns estimate the average PT hourly wage differential adding additional 
controls.  For instance, the second column shows that the PT penalty falls to 3 log 
points once we control for women socio-demographic characteristics.  The inclusion of 
additional employer controls changes the sign of the PT penalty into a small premium 
(of up to 3 log points once all controls have been added).  These results are in line with 
evidence from other (cross-sectional) studies from other countries that find that the 
“adjusted” PT/FT differential is very small (and it is mainly explained by workers’ 
characteristics and occupational segregation).34   
Nonetheless OLS estimates are based on a strong assumption that PT status is 
exogenous (conditional on the included covariates).  Clearly this is not the case, as 
                                                 
33 To identify participation into fixed-term versus permanent contract in Spain, Hernanz, 2002, uses 
gender, age, level of education, industry, public or private employer, firm size and region and working 
day duration (and occupation on the case of the estimation of the SES sample).  De la Rica, 2007, uses 
age, tenure and education, controls for occupation (at one-digit) and the rate of fixed-term contracts by 
autonomous community.  De la Rica, 2007, does not find evidence of selection into type of contract for 
females (while there is selection for males).  Hernanz’s estimates are not presented separately by sex, 
therefore we are unable to know whether her evidence of selection in the whole sample would hold when 
the analysis focuses on women. 
34 See, for instance, results from Australia (Rodgers, 2004), Belgium (Jepsen, 2001; Jepsen et al., 2005), 
Norway (Hardoy and Schøne, 2006), and the UK (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008), among others. 
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discussed earlier in Section II.  To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, we proceed to 
estimate the following fixed-effects equation (2), with results shown in row 2 of panel 
A: 
(2)  ( ) ( ) iitiitiitiit PTPTXXLnWLnW µµθβ −+−+−=− ''  
Notice that the estimator of interest is the coefficient of the indicator variable “part-
time” employment, θ . And hence, in the fixed-effects specification, θ  is capturing the 
switch into part-time employment (regardless of whether the worker changes employer 
or not). 35   
We find that the fixed-effects estimates display a PT premium in Spain that 
ranges between 6 and 8.5 log points.  Should we infer from these estimates that women 
working PT in Spain earn higher hourly earnings than those on FT work? Not 
necessarily.  Certainly, these results are difficult to reconcile with the evidence 
presented earlier (in Section III) suggesting that PT jobs in Spain are in the secondary 
labor market.   
To our knowledge, three other studies have estimated the PT/FT wage 
differential in Spain using a cross-sectional approach with data from the European 
Community Household Panel Survey (Pissarides et al., 2005; and Pagán Rodríguez, 
2007) and from the 2006 Survey on Income and Living Conditions Vida (Muñoz de 
Bustillo Llorente et al., 2008).  All three studies find evidence of an unadjusted hourly 
wage penalty associated with being a female PT worker (of between 10% and 16%), 
which becomes a PT premium after adjusting for observable characteristics (and self-
selection in the case of Pagán Rodríguez, 2007) in the two studies that use the European 
                                                 
35 This coefficient is estimated with alternative specifications, in which several covariates are sequentially 
added into the LHS of the equation.  In two of these specifications (the second to last and last 
specifications, shown in columns 6 and 7 of Table 6) we have controlled for whether there has been an 
employer change in each of the years of the employment history of the individual.  Note, however, that in 
this section of the paper, we do not interact the PT dummy with a change of employer dummy.  This is 
done in Section V.4. 
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Community Household Panel Survey.36  However, the Pissarides et al.’s PT premium 
vanishes when potential measurement error in hours and PT status are instrumented 
with lagged values.  The authors conclude that they are reluctant to believe their 
estimates as measurement error may still be affecting their IV estimates.37   
Given that our data comes from Social Security records it ought to be less 
spurious than workers’ survey data overcoming the measurement error problem found 
in earlier studies.  Nonetheless, given our results thus far, we suspected that our 
measure of hours, that is, contractual hours, could be consistently underreporting actual 
worked hours for PT workers relative to FT workers, which would lead to a differential 
measurement error in contractual hours by PT status.  An explanation for this is that 
employers have an incentive to underreport contractual hours to reduce their labor 
costs.  Given that PT workers tend to be in more vulnerable situations than FT workers 
(Belous, 1989; Bardasi and Gornich, 2000; Connolly and Gregory 2008 and 2009; 
Manning and Petrongolo, 2008), and given the higher dispersion of hours worked 
among PT workers compared to FT workers in Spain (Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente et 
al., 2008), underreporting of contractual hours, albeit unlawful, seems to be an easier 
and more common practice for PT contracts than FT ones.  Using data from the Time 
Use Survey, Figure 2 provides evidence that PT workers consistently work a greater 
number of hours in excess of contractual hours relative to their FT counterparts, which 
biases upwards the hourly wages of PT workers (relative to FT workers) leading to 
underestimating the PT wage penalty.38   
                                                 
36 In the other study, the ‘unadjusted’ PT penalty vanishes after controlling for workers’ and job 
characteristics. 
37 The other two studies do not correct for measurement error. 
38 The effective-contractual hours’ gap for PT workers is significantly different from the gap for FT 
workers at the 1% level across all age and education groups. 
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One way to address this problem is to use imputed effective hours to calculate 
the hourly wage as opposed to contractual hours.39  Rows 3 and 4 of panel A of Table 6 
show pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates using as dependent variable hourly wages 
calculated with imputed effective hours.  The fixed-effects estimates show that, on 
average, women working PT in Spain earn 19 log points less per hour than their FT 
counterparts (after controlling for women socio-demographic characteristics—column 2 
row 4 of panel A).  In addition, comparing rows 3 and 4 of panel A shows that the OLS 
estimates consistently overestimate the PT penalty relative to the fixed-effect estimates 
suggesting that women who move into PT are negatively self-selected, a common 
finding in this literature.  These estimates highlight the weaknesses of using cross-
sectional data for undertaking such type of analysis.  A priori, our cross-sectional 
analysis seemed to offer sound results consistent with those found earlier in the 
literature.  However, the availability of longitudinal data enables us to further 
investigate our findings and to uncover a new identification problem, not discussed (to 
our knowledge) in the literature until now.   
The analysis thus far has analyzed the average hourly wage difference between 
women working PT and FT.  However, the average effect may hide important 
differences across groups.  In what follows, we study the PT hourly wage penalty by 
type of contract.  The rationale being that the effect of PT on hourly wages and the 
channels through which it operates may well differ by the level of job protection the 
worker has, and whether she is in the primary labor market (with a permanent contract) 
or in the secondary labor market (with a fixed-term contract).  For instance, low levels 
of unionization (Belous, 1989), and lower accumulation of skills and lower returns to 
skills (Connolly and Gregory, 2009; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008) are found both in 
                                                 
39 Imputed hours come from a regression of worked hours against contractual hours, age, education, two-
digit industry dummies and occupation dummies using the Spanish Time Use Survey Dataset. 
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PT jobs and ‘bad’ jobs.  In addition, Bardasi and Gornich, 2000, have found evidence 
that this association is likely to be the strongest in countries where the size of the PT 
labor market is small, that is, where PT work is more likely to be in a ‘marginalized’ 
fringe of the labor market, such as in Spain. 
Panel B and C of Table 6 replicate the analysis done in panel A but for two 
separate sub-samples.  The heterogeneity analysis shows that the average effect of PT 
work on hourly wages differs by type of contract, bringing to light that the PT penalty 
is considerably larger for workers in the secondary labor market.  Our preferred 
estimates (second column of rows 4) show that women with permanent contracts have, 
on average, 9 log points less hourly earnings than their FT counterparts.  However, the 
PT hourly wage differential more than doubles (23 log points) for women with fixed-
term contracts.  In addition, examining the results from panels B and C shows that the 
negative sample selection that we are able to correct for when using fixed-effects is 
considerably larger for workers with permanent contracts.  While the PT penalty for 
workers in the primary sector gets reduced by two thirds when moving from the OLS 
estimate to the fixed-effects one (from -27 to -9 log points), it only decreases by one 
third (from -32 to -23 log points) for workers in the secondary labor market.  This 
finding may be explained by the fact that women with permanent contracts have job 
protection and are ‘free’ to move to PT work without ‘too many’ penalties.  In contrast, 
for women with fixed-term contracts their move to PT may be ‘less voluntary’.  
Evidence on voluntariness of PT work shown in Section III corroborates that indeed PT 
tends to be more involuntary among women with temporary contracts than those with 
permanent contracts.  In addition, we find that the reduction of the differential 
measurement error bias is greater for women with fixed-term contracts as one would 
expect if employers are more prone to under-report contractual hours among the most 
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vulnerable workers.  Finally, Appendix Table A.1 summarizes the fixed-effects 
coefficients on the control variables for our most complete specification (last column of 
rows 3 and 4 of Table 6).   
While the results in this section highlight the existence of a PT hourly wage 
differential in Spain, and show that employment protection reduces it by more than 
half, they cannot provide much guidance on what explains the penalty as some noise 
remains in the LHS variable due to the fact that its denominator has been imputed 
(notice that the estimates do not vary much as we control for additional covariates).40  
In what follows, we propose to analyze how the change in log hourly wages differs by 
PT status and to explore how working PT affects the workers’ earnings trajectories. 
 
V.2. PT log hourly wage growth differential 
Assuming that differential measurement error by PT status is an individual-
employment-status fixed effect, and dropping from our sample the wage observation 
the year in which the switch from FT to PT occurs, we estimate the effect of working 
PT on the change in log hourly wages free of differential measurement error.  To do so, 
we estimate the equations (3) (OLS) and (4) (fixed-effects) below: 
(3) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1it it it it it it i itLnW X PT FIXED PT FIXEDβ θ γ λ φ µ− − − − − −∆ = + + + × + +  
Here, itLnW∆ is the change in the natural log of real hourly earnings of individual i 
between year t-1 and year t; 1itX −  is a vector of individual and job characteristics 
previously described for individual i at time t-1, with β the corresponding coefficient 
vector (including an intercept).  1−itPT  is a binary variable equal to one if the worker’s 
principal job is PT in year t-1; 1itFIXED −  is a binary variable equal to one if the worker 
                                                 
40 As long as the noise is not related to PT status, it ought not to have an effect on our estimate of PT 
work. 
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holds a fixed-term contract at time t-1.  The error term includes both a random 
component µit with mean zero and constant variance, and a worker-specific fixed effect
iφ .  All regressions use the Huber/White estimator of variance and allow for 
observations not being independent within cluster-individuals.   
 
(4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 1 1' ' ' 'it i it i it i it i it i i i it iLnW LnW X X PT PT FIXED FIXED PT FIXED PT FIXEDβ θ γ λ µ µ− − − − − −∆ − ∆ = − + − + − + × − × + −
  
As in equation (2), in equation (4) we identify the effect of PT work through those who 
switch PT status (regardless of whether they change employers or not).  In contrast with 
estimates obtained with equations (1) and (2), in the regressions (3) and (4) we do not 
use the observation of the year the switch occurs.  This implies that we lose those 
individuals for which we do not observe at least two consecutive periods in a given 
FT/PT status.  If this loss were large, it could lead to a problem of sample selection.  
Fortunately, the number of individuals that we lose because we do not observe at least 
two consecutive periods in a given FT/PT status is very small as shown in Table 7 and 
ought not to be a concern in terms of selection bias as it represents less than 1.3% of the 
whole sample, and less than 4% of those who switch to PT work at some point in the 
sample—notice also that only half of these we lose to non-employment.   
As explained earlier, for ease of exposition, equations (3) and (4) use a simple 
dummy variable approach to measure the change in log wage differences associated 
with PT status and type of contract, conditional on controls.41   
Table 8 presents our pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the PT penalty on 
wage change using data from the CSWH, and controlling for different covariates.  
                                                 
41 Earnings change function parameters differ between PT and FT status and type of contract, but the gaps 
in the wage change estimated using the dummy variable approach differ little from those based on 
separate equations by PT status and contract type, and evaluated at the means. 
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Panel A shows estimates for the whole sample, whereas Panel B shows the estimates 
for workers with fixed-term contracts and those with permanent contracts.      
 There are important differences between women with fixed-term contracts and 
those with permanent contracts.  After accounting for workers’ observable and 
unobservable characteristics (column 3 of Panel B), we find that PT women with 
permanent contracts experience on average 2.9 log points lower hourly wage growth 
per year than their FT counterparts, and that PT women with fixed-term contracts 
experience 3.9 log points lower hourly wage growth per year than their FT 
counterparts.  How large are these estimates?  We claim that these estimates are 
considerably large and concerning.  For instance, compared to the effect of education 
on hourly wage growth, we find that having a college degree or more increases 
women’s hourly wage growth by 2 log points per year compared to women without a 
high-school degree.  Therefore, the size of the PT penalty is almost one-and-a-half that 
of the college premium among women with permanent contracts and nearly doubles 
that of the college premium among women with fixed-term contracts.  Notice also that 
the PT penalty for women with fixed-term contracts is one fourth larger (and 
statistically significantly so) than for women with permanent contracts, suggesting that 
there is a negative relationship between job protection and the PT penalty. 
 Also worth highlighting is the change in the estimates when moving from the 
unadjusted PT growth penalty (column 1 of Panel B) to the penalty once workers’ 
characteristics are accounted for (column 2 of Panel B), especially for women with 
fixed-term contracts, as the estimate falls more than one fifth, from 3.2 to 2.7 log 
points.42  In addition, we also observe that the PT growth penalty rises to 3.9 log points 
for women with fixed-term contracts, once we control for unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                 
42 While a decrease is also observed for women with permanent contracts, the size of the decrease is 
smaller. 
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(column 3 of panel B), suggesting that there is “second-order” positive selection into 
PT work for women with fixed-term contracts (remember that the levels estimates 
showed the traditional “first-order” negative self-selection into PT jobs for women with 
both types of contracts).43  
 Adding additional controls for employer characteristics, industry, employer and 
occupation change and intermittences does not change much the results, suggesting that 
this hourly wage growth FT/PT differential holds even after most of the job 
characteristics have been controlled for.  Our inability to explain the wage growth gap 
suggests that it does not seem to be explained by the types of jobs women working PT 
have (compared to those working FT).  In Section V.4, we shall explore how changing 
employers at the time of the switch into PT affects workers’ earnings trajectories. 
 
V.3.  Sensitivity Analyses 
Before proceeding any further, we discuss the different robustness checks that we have 
performed and that are shown in the Appendix.  First, we have verified the validity of 
the use of imputed hours by exploring whether a greater measurement error correction 
takes place among workers older than 34 years old than for those younger than 35 years 
old as the observed difference between effective and contractual hours (for both PT and 
FT workers) is greater for the older than the younger workers.  Second, we have re-
estimated our growth analysis with imputed wages to verify that this alternative 
correction approach delivers the same results as those shown above.  Third, we have re-
estimated our preferred specifications (both in levels and in growth) using an IV 
approach to control for the endogeneity by type of contract. Fourth, we have re-
estimated our preferred specifications using employer fixed-effects estimators.  Finally, 
                                                 
43 For workers with permanent contracts, we observe the more common negative self-selection result as 
we move from the OLS estimate to the fixed-effect one. 
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we re-estimated our preferred specifications for different subgroups to check that the 
results are not due to omitted variable bias (due to not having non-labor income data) or 
that they are not driven by women who chose to work PT due to family responsibilities.  
As is thoroughly explained in the Appendix, overall, the main findings of the paper are 
robust to all of these sensitivity tests. 
 
V.4. Earnings Trajectories and the cumulative PT penalty 
Up to now, our analysis has focused on the average effect of PT work on hourly wages 
and wage growth.  We have found that there is a PT/FT wage differential both in levels 
and in growth and that this differential is considerably larger for women with temporary 
contracts.  While we find strong evidence of negative self-selection (especially among 
women with permanent contracts), there is little support for the explanation that 
workers’, employers’ and job’s characteristics reduce the PT/FT wage level and growth 
gap.   
Thus far, we have only controlled for whether the worker changes employer in 
any given year in two specifications of Tables 6 and 8.44  However, we have not 
analyzed the effect of an employer change at the time of the switch into PT work.  In 
this section we propose to do so, at the same time that we analyze how a switch from 
FT to PT work affects workers’ earnings trajectories, that is, we are interested in 
knowing whether there is a PT pay penalty not only the first year after switching to PT 
work but also thereafter.  If women in the primary labor market are protected and have 
certain discretion to reduce work hours, we ought to see that the PT/FT wage gap 
mainly arises when these women switch employers (and therefore lose their acquired 
                                                 
44Only the two last specifications (columns 6 and 7 of Table 6, and columns 8 through 11 of Table 8) 
controlled for whether there had been an employer change in each of the years of the employment history 
of the individual, however, this change of employer variable was not interacted with the PT dummy. 
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rights).  In contrast, because women in the secondary labor market are in considerably 
more precarious jobs, it is unclear whether staying with the same employer will 
preclude them from a reduction in hourly earnings at the time of the PT switch.  To 
proceed in such analysis we estimate the following specifications in levels (equation 5) 
and in growth (equation 6).   
(5) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' ' ' 'it i it i it i it i it it it i it iLnW LnW X X PT PT CE CE PT CE PT CEβ θ τ ϕ µ µ− = − + − + − + × − × + −
Where itCE  is a binary variable equal to one if the worker changed employer the year of 
the change from FT to PT status.  The estimators of interest are the coefficient of the 
indicator variable “part-time” employment, θ , which captures the switch into PT 
employment if the worker does not change employer the year of the switch and the sum 
of the coefficients, θ τ ϕ+ + , which captures the switch into PT employment if the 
worker changes employer the year of the switch.  Notice that this analysis is done 
separately by type of contract at time t. 
 
(6)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )5 51 1 1
1 1
' ' ' 'it i it i k it k i it i k it k i i i
k k
LnW LnW X X PT PT FIXED FIXED PT FIXED PT FIXEDβ θ γ λ+ +− − − − −
= =
∆ − ∆ = − + − + − + × − ×∑ ∑
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )51 1 1
1
' 'it i k it k i i i it i
k
CE CE PT CE PT CEτ ϕ µ µ+− − − −
=
+ − + × − × + −∑  
Where
5
1
t k
k
PT
+
−
=
∑
  is a vector of five dummies indicating whether the individual has been 
working PT the last year, for the previous two years, and so on, up to “for the previous 
five or more”. For a worker who has been working PT the last year, the estimators of 
interest are: (i) the coefficient of the indicator variable “part-time” employment, 1θ , 
which captures the switch into PT employment if the worker has a permanent contract 
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and does not change employer the year of the switch; (ii) the sum of the coefficients, 
1 1θ γ λ+ + , which captures the switch into PT employment if the worker has a fixed-
term contract and does not change employer the year of the switch; (iii) the sum of the 
coefficients, 1 1θ τ ϕ+ + , which captures the switch into PT employment if the worker 
has a permanent contract and changes employer the year of the switch; and (4) the sum 
of the coefficients, 1 1 1θ γ λ τ ϕ+ + + + , which captures the switch into PT employment if 
the worker has a fixed-term contract and changes employer the year of the switch.   
The coefficients of interest are displayed in Table 9.A. for workers with fixed-
term contracts and Table 9.B. for workers with permanent contracts.  The coefficient 
for the year of the switch comes from estimating equation (5) and the other coefficients 
come from equation (6).  These coefficients are plotted in Figure 3, which shows the 
cumulative PT penalty by type of contract differentiating by whether the worker 
changes employer at the time of the PT switch or not.  While panel A of Figure 3 
presents the cumulative PT penalty estimated with the specification that controls for 
workers’ characteristics, panel B shows the estimates when we control for both workers 
and employers’ characteristics. 
An important insight emerges from panel A of Figure 3.  For workers with 
permanent contracts, the PT hourly wage gap in levels is mainly explained by the 
change of employer at the time of the switch to PT work.  While no PT penalty is 
observed among those workers who remain with the same employer, the switch to PT 
work imposes an immediate earnings penalty of 10 log points if the worker changes 
employers.45  Such differential remains in evidence over at least four years.  In addition, 
                                                 
45 These results are in line with those found by Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, for the UK, where they 
find that for those women who change hours status without changing employer there is a very small pay 
penalty of 0.2%. 
 38
panel B shows that half of this penalty is accounted for by differences in the employers’ 
characteristics of FT and PT workers. 
For workers in the secondary labor market, we also find that changing 
employers at the time of the switch to PT work is a source of earnings penalty of 
similar size (a bit over 10 log points), of which, one fourth are explained by employers’ 
characteristics.46  However, there is a profound difference between workers in the 
primary and the secondary labor market.  Those with temporary contracts suffer an 
additional hourly wage loss in levels of 9 log points at the time of the switch to PT that 
is not explained by employer switch or other observable job characteristics. 
In addition, Figure 3 also reveals interesting information on the return to PT 
experience, which is very different in the primary labor market than in the secondary 
one.  For instance, for workers with permanent contracts, the return to PT experience 
gives a negative return during the first year and becomes flat thereafter.  In contrast, for 
workers in the secondary market (those with fixed-term contract), we find that PT 
experience gives a negative return for at least the first four years.  These results are in 
line with Hirsch, 2005, and CG who find that accumulated skills account for much of 
the PT wage disadvantage among workers in the US (the former) and the UK (the 
latter).  Moreover, similar to CG, we find that the returns to PT work are lower in lower 
level jobs—CG find lower returns to PT work for workers in lower level occupations. 
To sum up, for workers in the primary labor market, we find that the PT penalty 
is explained by the change of employer and lower quality jobs, as well as negligible 
returns to PT work experience during the first few years in PT work.  Once these 
channels are taken into account, neither PT status nor the switch into PT is associated 
with a significant pay penalty directly.  However, these three channels do give rise to 
                                                 
46 Note that the fact that job characteristics explains less of the PT penalty for workers with fixed-term 
contracts than for those with permanent contracts is consistent with the fact that jobs in the secondary 
labor market are already ‘bad’ jobs. 
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non-negligible earnings losses, and it takes at least four years for these penalties to 
vanish.  Perhaps not surprisingly, these results are not so different from those found in 
countries in which PT is well established, such as the UK.   
In contrast, for workers in the secondary labor market, the PT penalties are greater 
and long-lasting, raising serious concern for such workers in these types of contracts.  
We find that the switch to PT status in itself is associated with a 10 log points 
immediate drop in earnings that we are unable to explain with workers’ observable or 
unobservable characteristics nor employers’ attributes. In addition to this unexplained 
PT penalty, we find evidence that the returns to experience in PT work are negative.  
Finally, the PT penalty is exacerbated by lower quality jobs and job change (as it was in 
the primary labor market). 
 
VI. Direction for Policy 
According to CG, in the UK, there is an excess supply of PT hours by British women.  
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that there is a high proportion of women in the 
UK working PT (40% of the female employment) and that they are happily doing so 
(80% of those working PT say they do not wish a FT job), despite the 10.6 log percent 
loss of hourly earnings this work arrangement represents.  In Spain, the issue is 
drastically different.  Spain has one of the lowest proportion of women working PT 
among advanced economies, and the pay penalty to PT work is among the worst since 
on average, it almost doubles that of the UK.  
The evidence from the UK also indicates that the substantial short- and long-
term penalties result from occupational downgrading (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008, 
and CG).  Similarly, in Spain, we find that, in the primary labor market (permanent 
contracts), the FT/PT wage differential is explained by a change of employer and that 
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half of this gap is caused by the different types of jobs these women do.  However, the 
story is considerably more complex in the secondary labor market (temporary 
contracts).  For women with a temporary contract, on top of the 10 log points FT/PT 
wage gap due to the change of employer, there is an additional 9 log points gap that we 
are unable to explain with workers’ observable or unobservable characteristics, nor 
employers’ attributes.  Thus, the FT/PT wage differential, possibly the result of 
employers’ discrimination, a higher cost of hiring or both,  is aggravated in the 
secondary labor market. Not surprisingly, over 60% of workers (including men and 
women) working PT in Spain say they would prefer a FT job—compared to no more 
than one fourth in other European countries.  
Regardless of whether the larger PT penalty among temporary workers arises 
because PT workers are more discriminated against or whether they are more costly to 
hire than FT workers in the secondary market, it is still a result of this paper that the 
Spanish dual system of job protection exacerbates the economic cost of PT work. A  
policy implication from this result is that promoting PT work in order to add flexibility 
to a rigid labor market, imposes heavy costs to either firms, workers or both unless the 
difference between permanent and temporary workers is corrected in the first place.  
Therefore, it is probably best to promote regulation changes that will decrease the high 
firing costs of workers in the primary segment of the labor market, and that will aim at 
reducing the differences between fixed-term and permanent workers.  
In light of these results it is important to know whether most part-timers in Spain 
are in that state transitionally, or if they are permanently involved in PT work.47  If PT is 
                                                 
47 Much international evidence analyzes the extent to which workers become trapped in particular labor 
markets and find evidence of strong state persistence.  For the US, where the incidence of PT work 
among prime-aged women is as low as in Spain but temporary contracts are practically inexistent, Blank, 
1998, identifies two leading patterns in transitions through PT work.  For the majority, a spell in PT work 
serves as an alternative to FT work, to which they return.  The primary role of PT work among American 
women is thus the “maintenance” one, supporting continued labor maker participations within basically a 
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mainly a transitional state from FT employment, results from the PT penalty, although 
concerning, would be equivalent to an idiosyncratic shock in workers’ earnings 
trajectories.  In contrast, if we find that women going into PT work remain in that status 
or alternate it with non-employment, the PT penalty findings ought to raise major social 
concern.  Using similar data than the one used in the current paper, Fernández-Kranz 
and Rodríguez-Planas, 2010, find that, for women with temporary contracts, PT work in 
Spain is part of an “exclusionary” cycle, where low-wage, insecure PT jobs alternate 
with spells of non-employment.  While different, the story is not much more promising 
for women with permanent contracts.  Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2010, 
find that while continuing FT work is by far the most prevalent state in the primary 
labor market, when women work PT, their work arrangements follow the same 
“exclusionary” pattern than in the secondary market.  These authors’ findings suggest 
that,— except for a minority of women with permanent contracts who do not change 
employers for whom PT spells have a role as “maintenance” spells supporting 
continued labor market participation within a basically FT career—, PT jobs in Spain 
are a dead-end for Spanish women’s careers.  All in all, it ought not to come to a 
surprise that Spanish women do not want to work PT, especially if they are in the 
secondary labor market.   
Finally, our results bring to light another dimension of gender and family pay 
gaps in segmented labor markets. Given the relative concentration of mothers in PT 
                                                                                                                                               
FT career.  The other major group, which Blank identifies enter PT work from non-employment and then 
leave the labor market again, showing PT work forming part of an “exclusionary” cycle of weak labor 
market attachment. Using data on the UK, where PT work among prime-aged women is considerably 
more common than in Spain but fixed-term contracts are not as frequently used, O’Reilly and Bothfeld, 
2002; and Connolly and Gregory, 2010, find diverging results.  While O’Reilly and Bothfeld find that 
over a five-year period, PT work follows an “exclusionary” pattern where it is interspersed with spells of 
non-employment; Connolly and Gregory, 2010, follow a 1958 birth cohort from their early twenties until 
they are aged 42 in 2000 and find that PT work serves two different functions.  Women whose past 
history predominantly involves FT work, possibly in conjunction with spells of PT work or non-
employment, revert to FT work.  Women whose labor market histories combine spells in PT with non-
employment are unlikely to subsequently take up FT work.  According to these authors, PT work is both 
a support and a trap for women’s future careers, but these alternative roles apply to different groups. 
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work, they suggests that Spain is still far from enabling the conciliation of work and 
family through the reduction of regular work schedule.  While PT work seems to be an 
option for reconciling work and family for some women with permanent contracts, this 
is clearly not the case for women with fixed-term contracts (Fernández-Kranz and 
Rodríguez-Planas, 2010).  Given the vast reserve of potential labor force that represent 
inactive women in Spain,48 and considering the challenges that the Spanish society has 
in reconciling work and family,49 the current laws allowing for flexible working hours 
for mothers of young children are clearly not sufficient.  Other policies (such as raising 
the availability of affordable good-quality childcare) ought to be used to help women 
turn to FT jobs with more prospects.  An alternative solution may be to reduce the 
negative future career consequences of a period spent in PT work, for example by 
giving parents greater rights to change hours (including to work PT but also to resume 
their full-time job).  While the right to request flexible work arrangements was first 
introduced in Spain in 1999 by giving parents of children under eight or with 
dependents the right to work flexibly, the impact to date appears to have been limited to 
workers in the primary labor market who do not change employers, as those with fixed-
term contracts are let go when their contract expires (Fernandez-Kranz and Rodríguez-
Planas, 2010). 
 
                                                 
48 Buddelmeyer et al. (2005) estimate that 38% of females remained inactive in Spain between 1994 and 
1999 (compared to an average of 26% in the EU).   
49 Sanchez-Mangas and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) highlight the following five stylized facts that illustrate 
the difficulties Spanish mothers have in reconciling employment and family.  First, the Spanish 
employment rate for mothers is among the lowest in the OECD (Gutiérrez-Domenech, 2005).  Second, 
Spanish maternity leave is, on average, nine weeks shorter than in most of the European countries 
(OECD, 2001).  Third, the use of formal child-care arrangements for three-year-old children is much less 
frequent in Spain than in the average European country.  For instance, in 2001 the proportion of children 
under the age of three in preschool was only 9 percent in Spain, in sharp contrast with the European 
average of 25 percent.  Fourth, the 2004 Spanish Labor Population Survey indicates that 29 percent of 
women aged 45 and younger reported family responsibilities as their main reason for not participating in 
the labor market.  Last, but not least, having one of the lowest fertility rate among the EU-15 countries is 
also indicative of difficulties of reconciling work and family in Spain (Eurostat, 2007). 
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Table 1 
Incidence of Female Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment, OECD 2008 
 
 Incidence of female PT 
employment  
Incidence of female 
temporary employment 
Australia 37.7% 5.9% 
Belgium 33.8% 9.7% 
Germany 38.6% 14.9% 
The Netherlands 59.9% 20% 
Norway 30.8% 11.1% 
Spain 21.1% 31.2% 
The United Kingdom 37.7% 6% 
The United States 17.8% 4.2% 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Part-Time Employment and Type of Contract by Type of Contract in Spain 
Workers 20 to 65 years old 
1999-2009 Labor Force Survey (2nd Semester) 
 
 Permanent contract Temporary contract 
 Women 
% Working PT 15.67% 29.84% 
% Working FT 84.33% 70.16% 
Sample size 161,155 78.073 
 Men 
% Working PT 1.45% 6.77% 
% Working FT 98.55% 93.23% 
Sample size 240,234 92,920 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 Full-time Job Preferences 
2005 Social Survey Programme (ISSP)—Work Orientations Module 
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Table 3 
Reasons for Working Part-Time Employment by Type of Contract and Sex in Spain 
Workers 20 to 65 years old 
1999-2009 Labor Force Survey (2nd Semester) 
 
 Permanent contract Temporary contract 
 Women  
Involuntary PT work
Could not find a FT job 24.99% 40.46% 
PT work was a job 
requirement 
22.94% 24.65% 
Voluntary PT work 
Family reasons 28.60% 12.48% 
Educational or health reasons 18.02% 16.03% 
 Men 
Involuntary PT work
Could not find a FT job 24.62% 38.31% 
PT work was a job 
requirement 
34.64% 24.68% 
Voluntary PT work
Family reasons 4.47% 0.97% 
Educational or health reasons 27.51% 28.20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Sample Sizes 
Women Strongly Attached to the Labor Force, 1996-2006 CSWH 
(24 to 45 years old) 
(In parenthesis, as a % of the total number of individuals in each category) 
 
 Whole sample Permanent contract at 
time t-1 
Fixed-term contract at 
time t-1 
Number of individuals 76,025 54,726 50,015 
    Of  which only work FT 59,556    (78.34%) 44,504    (81.13%) 35,947    (71.87%) 
    Of which switch to PT 16,469    (21.66%) 10,222    (18.68%) 14,068    (28.13%) 
             Of which return to FT  8,153      (49.51%) 4,968      (48.60%) 7,549      (53.34%) 
Note: Because one individual can appear under different categories in different waves of the panel, the number on individuals 
who were on a permanent contract plus those on a fixed contract is larger than the whole sample.  
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics.  Women Strongly Attached to the Labor Force, 2006 CSWH 
 Permanent contract Fixed-term contract 
 FT worker PT worker FT worker PT worker 
Change in log real hourly 
earnings 
.034 
(.165) 
.000† 
(.252) 
.035 
(.290) 
.012† 
(.337) 
Log of current hourly 
earnings in cents of € 
6.883 
(.408) 
6.729† 
(.389) 
6.788 
(.403) 
6.646† 
(.412) 
Age 24 to 29 years old 
(percent) 
.331 
(.470) 
.227† 
(.419) 
.380 
(.485) 
.272† 
(.445) 
Age 30 to 34 years old 
(percent) 
.381 
(.485) 
.423† 
(.494) 
.360 
(.480) 
.378† 
(.485) 
Age 35 to 39 years old 
(percent) 
.160 
(.367) 
.221† 
(.415) 
.150 
(.357) 
.197† 
(.397) 
Age 40 to 45 years old 
(percent) 
.127 
(.333) 
.127 
(.334) 
.107 
(.310) 
.151† 
(.358) 
Cohabiting (percent) .763 
(.424) 
.800† 
(.399) 
.760 
(.426) 
.765† 
(.423) 
Without children (percent) .642 
(.479) 
.390† 
(.487) 
.661 
(.473) 
.474† 
(.499) 
With children 0 to 2 years 
old (percent) 
.146 
(.353) 
.249† 
(.432) 
.106 
(.308) 
.155† 
(.362) 
With children 3 years old 
(percent) 
.026 
(.162) 
.073† 
(.261) 
.026 
(.160) 
.058† 
(.253) 
With children 4 to 6 years 
old (percent) 
.051 
(.221) 
.110† 
(.313) 
.055 
(.228) 
.095† 
(.294) 
With children older than 6 
years old (percent) 
.132 
(.339) 
.175† 
(.380) 
.149 
(.356) 
.215† 
(.411) 
High-school dropout 
(percent) 
.307 
(.461) 
.422† 
(.494) 
.362 
(.480) 
.468† 
(.499) 
High-school graduate 
(percent) 
.398 
(.489) 
.389† 
(.487) 
.295 
(.456) 
.303† 
(.459) 
College graduate or above 
(percent) 
.294 
(.455) 
.187† 
(.390) 
.342 
(.474) 
.228† 
(.419) 
Experience in PT 
employment (in years) 
.295 
(1.553) 
7.867† 
(4.519) 
.347 
(1.256) 
4.599† 
(2.952) 
Experience in FT 
employment (in years) 
8.133 
(4.742) 
.180† 
(.899) 
4.476 
(3.003) 
.049† 
(.511) 
Public servant (percent) .044 
(.205) 
.002† 
(.053) 
.119 
(.324) 
.020† 
(.142) 
Firm tenure (in years) 5.089 
(4.532) 
4.523† 
(4.278) 
1.805 
(2.021 
1.507† 
(1.726) 
Firm size (number of 
workers) 
545.165 
(1729.016) 
514.845† 
(2043.409) 
725.393 
(1925.107) 
394.063† 
(1410.323) 
White Collar (percent) .231 
(.421) 
.120† 
(.325) 
.261 
(.439) 
.137† 
(.344) 
Manufacturing .130 
(.336) 
.083† 
(.275) 
.079 
(.271) 
.040† 
(.196) 
Trade .247 
(.431) 
.331† 
(.470) 
.111 
(.314) 
.176† 
(.381) 
Services .588 
(.492) 
.553† 
(.497) 
.750 
(.432) 
.753 
(.430) 
Construction .028 
(.167) 
.029 
(.168) 
.053 
(.225) 
.025† 
(.158) 
Immigrant .060 
(.238) 
.061 
(.240) 
.073 
(.002) 
.067† 
(.004) 
Changed employer at t .142 
(.349) 
.179† 
(.005) 
.442 
(.003) 
.572† 
(.008) 
Changed occupation at t .109 
(.312) 
.144† 
(.351) 
.348 
(.476) 
.463† 
(.498) 
Intermittencies (as % of 
potential experience) until t 
.022 
(.078) 
.060† 
(.126) 
.085 
(.153) 
.137† 
(.182) 
Number of individuals 32,343 3,110 16,537 1,832 
Note.- The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All hourly wages are deflated by the gross domestic  
product (GDP) deflator (base year = 2006).  † PT mean significantly different from FT mean at the 90% confidence level.   
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Table 6 
Estimation of the Part-Time Pay Penalty, Different methodologies 
Dependent variable: Ln(real hourly wage) 
 
 Unadjusted  +  
Workers 
controls 
 
+  
Employer 
characteristic 
+ 
Industry 
controls 
+ 
Occupation 
controls 
+  
Change 
occupation 
or  
employer 
+ 
Intermitte
nces 
Panel A:  Whole sample (number of observations : 591,063) 
1.  Pooled  
     OLS 
-.109*** 
(.003) 
-.033*** 
(.003) 
-.025*** 
(.003) 
+.005* 
(.003) 
+.027*** 
(.002) 
+.028*** 
(.002) 
+.029*** 
(.002) 
2.  Fixed-   
     effects 
+.062*** 
(.001) 
+.070*** 
(.001) 
+.075*** 
(.001) 
+.079*** 
(.001) 
+.085*** 
(.001) 
+.085*** 
(.001) 
+.085*** 
(.001) 
Using imputed effective hours to estimate LHS variable 
3.  Pooled  
     OLS 
-.376*** 
(.003) 
-.298*** 
(.003) 
-.290*** 
(.003) 
-.259*** 
(.003) 
-.236*** 
(.003) 
-.234*** 
(.003) 
-.232*** 
(.003) 
4.  Fixed-   
     effects 
-.195*** 
(.001) 
-.187*** 
(.001) 
-.182*** 
(.001) 
-.176*** 
(.001) 
-.171*** 
(.001) 
-.171*** 
(.001) 
-.171*** 
(.001) 
Panel B:  With fixed-term contracts (number of observations: 194,218) 
1.  Pooled  
     OLS 
-.057*** 
(.004) 
-.023*** 
(.004) 
-.005 
(.004) 
+.016*** 
(.003) 
+.031*** 
(.003) 
+.032*** 
(.003) 
+.031*** 
(.003) 
2.  Fixed-   
     effects 
+.049*** 
(.002) 
+.055*** 
(.002) 
+.062*** 
(.002) 
+.068*** 
(.002) 
+.069*** 
(.002) 
+.070*** 
(.002) 
+.071*** 
(.002) 
Using imputed effective hours to estimate LHS variable 
3.  Pooled  
     OLS 
-.352*** 
(.004) 
-.319*** 
(.004) 
-.300*** 
(.004) 
-.277*** 
(.004) 
-.262*** 
(.004) 
-.261*** 
(.004) 
-.260*** 
(.004) 
4.  Fixed-   
     effects 
-.237*** 
(.003) 
-.230*** 
(.003) 
-.223*** 
(.003) 
-.216*** 
(.003) 
-.215*** 
(.003) 
-.213*** 
(.003) 
-.213*** 
(.003) 
Panel C:  With permanent contracts (number of observations: 396,845) 
1.  Pooled  
     OLS 
-.122*** 
(.005) 
-.037*** 
(.004) 
-.033*** 
(.004) 
+.005 
(.004) 
+.034*** 
(.004) 
+.036*** 
(.004) 
+.040*** 
(.004) 
2.  Fixed-   
     effects 
+.111*** 
(.002) 
+.119*** 
(.002) 
+.120*** 
(.002) 
+.121*** 
(.002) 
+.127*** 
(.002) 
+.128*** 
(.002) 
+.128*** 
(.002) 
Using imputed effective hours to estimate LHS variable 
3.  Pooled  
     OLS 
-.360*** 
(.005) 
-.273*** 
(.005) 
-.269*** 
(.005) 
-.229*** 
(.004) 
-.200*** 
(.004) 
-.197*** 
(.004) 
-.191*** 
(.004) 
4.  Fixed-   
     effects 
-.095*** 
(.003) 
-.087*** 
(.003) 
-.086*** 
(.003) 
-.085*** 
(.003) 
-.079*** 
(.002) 
-.077*** 
(.002) 
-.078*** 
(.002) 
*** Significant at 1% level. Imputed hours come from a regression of effectively worked hours against contractual hours, age, 
ducation, two-digit industry and occupation using the Spanish Time Use Survey Dataset. A negative number indicates a penalty for part-
me workers. Each set of regressions has the following controls: UNADJUSTED – year and province dummies; WORKERS CONTROLS 
age, education, nationality, province of residence, experience and quadratic of experience, tenure, dummies that indicate the presence in 
he household of children and of children less than 6 years old, and a dummy indicator for immigrant status; EMPLOYER 
HARACTERISTICS – number of workers, public sector dummy; INDUSTRY & OCCUPATION – two-digits industry dummies and ten 
ccupation categories dummies;  CHANGE OF EMPLOYER – a dummy indicating if the individual’s employer at year t is different from t-
.  INTERMITTENCIES – the number of years not working relative to the number of years of potential experience. Potential experience is 
alculated as the difference between the current year and the year of entry in the Social Security System.   
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Figure 2 
Contractual and Effective Hours for PT and FT Workers 
2003 Time Use Survey 
 
 
 
Note: The effective-contractual hours gap for PT workers is significantly different from the gap 
for FT workers at the 1% level across all age and education groups. The effective-contractual 
hours gap is always positive for PT workers and negative for FT workers and the difference 
between the two groups of workers grows with age and the level of education: is -1.34 hours when 
age is between 25-34, -4.83 hours at ages 35 to 45, -1.85 hours for individuals with less than high 
school completed, -2.31 hours for those with a high school degree and -5.15 hours for college 
graduates.  
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Table 7 
 
Individual Attrition in Wage Change  
(In parenthesis, as a % of the total number of individuals in each category) 
 
 Whole 
sample 
Permanent 
contract at 
time t-1 
Fixed-term 
contract at 
time t-1 
Not 
working at 
time t-1 
 
Number of individuals* 962 
(1,27%) 
91 
(0.17%) 
537 
(1.07%) 
334 
         Of which only work in FT 324 
(0.54%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
324 
         Of which switch to PT 638 
(3.87%) 
91 
(1.83%) 
537 
(3.82%) 
10 
              And go to non-employment 305 
 
43 
 
276 6 
              And return to FT within one period 333 
 
48 261 4 
*Number of individuals we drop in the hourly wage change specification because we do not observe 
them for at least two consecutive years in a given employment status 
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Table 8 
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty 
Women 24 to 45 years old: CSWH 1996-2006 
 
 Pooled OLS 
(Unadjusted) 
Pooled OLS 
(Worker 
controls) 
Fixed-
effects 
(Worker 
controls) 
Pooled OLS 
(+ employer 
characteristi
cs) 
Fixed-
effects 
(+ employer 
characteristi
cs) 
Pooled OLS 
(+ industry) 
Fixed-
effects 
(+ industry) 
Pooled OLS 
(+employer 
and 
occupation 
change) 
Fixed-
effects 
(+employer 
and 
occupation 
change) 
Pooled OLS 
(+intermitte
ncies) 
Fixed-
effects 
(+intermitte
ncies) 
 (1) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Panel A. Without Contract Type 
 -.033*** 
(.001) 
-.032*** 
(.002) 
-.038*** 
(.004) 
-.032*** 
(.002) 
-.037*** 
(.004) 
-.031*** 
(.002) 
-.034*** 
(.004) 
-.028*** 
(.002) 
-.032*** 
(.004) 
-.030*** 
(.002) 
-.035*** 
(.004) 
Panel B. By Contract Type 
Fixed-term 
contract at 
time t 
-.032*** 
(.002) 
-.027*** 
(.003) 
-.039*** 
(.005) 
-.027*** 
(.003) 
-.037*** 
(.005) 
-.026*** 
(.003) 
-.036*** 
(.005) 
-.022*** 
(.003) 
-.034*** 
(.005) 
-.025*** 
(.003) 
-.037*** 
(.005) 
Permanent 
contract at 
time t 
-.035*** 
(.002) 
-.038***? 
(.003) 
-.029***? 
(.005) 
-.037***? 
(.003) 
-.031*** 
(.005) 
-.036***? 
(.003) 
-.026***? 
(.005) 
-.033***? 
(.003) 
-.025***? 
(.005) 
-.036***? 
(.003) 
-.027***? 
(.005) 
Sample size  468,532 468,532 468,532 468,532 468,532 468,532 468,532 468,532 468,532 468,532 468,532 
# 
Individuals 
75,063 75,063 75,063 75,063 75,063 75,063 75,063 75,063 75,063 75,063 75,063 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and calculated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). ? 
indicates that the difference of the estimated effects by type of contract is significant at the 10% level.  UNADJUSTED: regressions control for year and province dummies. 
WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, immigrant status, year, province, education, 
level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, and 
cohabiting status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: occupation, number of workers and public sector. INDUSTRY: are two-digits industry dummies. 
INTERMITTENCIES: the number of years not working relative to the number of years of potential experience. Potential experience is calculated as the difference between 
the current year and the year of entry in the Social Security System.   
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Figure 3. The Cumulative Part-Time Penalty by Years in Part-Time Work  
PANEL A. Controlling for worker characteristics  
 
 
Note: Women 24 to 45 years old strongly attached to the labor market. Results come from a first-
difference specification with individual fixed effects, where the dependent variable is the one-year 
change in real hourly wages and controls are: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in 
part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, year, province, education, level of experience in part-
time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with 
children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, cohabiting status, and immigrant status. Dashed 
lines represent the 5% confidence intervals of the part-time effect. The value for the first year in 
part-time job (switchers) comes from a regression where hours of work are effectively worked hours 
imputed using the Spanish Time Use Survey. 
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Figure 3. The Cumulative Part-Time Penalty by Years in Part-Time Work  
PANEL B. Controlling for worker, employer and job characteristics, 
and change of occupation and employer 
 
 
Note: Women 24 to 45 years old strongly attached to the labor market. Results come from a first-
difference specification with individual fixed effects, where the dependent variable is the one-year 
change in real hourly wages and controls are: worker characteristics + firm and job characteristics + 
change of occupation and change of employer. Dashed lines represent the 5% confidence intervals of 
the part-time effect. The value for the first year in part-time job (switchers) comes from a regression 
where hours of work are effectively worked hours imputed using the Spanish Time Use Survey. 
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Table 9.A 
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty for Workers with Fixed-Term Contract at 
Time t-1, by Experience in Part-time Work 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
 Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Fixed-effects 
 (Worker controls + employer 
characteristics + change occupation or 
employer) 
 Marginal effects Cumulative 
effects 
Marginal effects Cumulative 
effects 
Number of consecutive years in part-time work if no change of employer the year of the switching
The year of 
switching 
-.091*** 
(.008) 
 -.097*** 
(.008) 
 
At least 1 
year  
-.071*** 
(.007) 
-.071*** 
(.007) 
-.071*** 
(.007) 
-.071*** 
(.007) 
At least 2 
years  
-.020** 
(.010) 
-.090*** 
(.014) 
-.022** 
(.010) 
-.092*** 
(.014) 
At least 3 
years 
.008 
(.014) 
-.082*** 
(.023) 
.004 
(.014) 
-.088*** 
(.022) 
At least 4 
years  
-.035* 
(.019) 
-.115*** 
(.032) 
-.038** 
(.018) 
-.123*** 
(.032) 
At least 5 
years  
-.018 
(.020) 
-.131*** 
(.042) 
-.023 
(.020) 
-.144*** 
(.041) 
At least 6 
years 
-.018 
(.020) 
-.147*** 
(.055) 
-.023 
(.020) 
-.164*** 
(.053) 
Number of consecutive years in part-time work if  change of employer the year of the switching 
The year of 
switching 
-.251*** 
(.004) 
 -.230*** 
(.004) 
 
At least 1 
year  
-.023*** 
(.005) 
-.023*** 
(.005) 
-.028*** 
(.005) 
-.028*** 
(.005) 
At least 2 
years  
-.028*** 
(.008) 
-.050*** 
(.011) 
-.033*** 
(.008) 
-.061*** 
(.011) 
At least 3 
years 
-.011 
(.011) 
-.061*** 
(.018) 
-.021* 
(.011) 
-.080*** 
(.018) 
At least 4 
years  
-.032** 
(.016) 
-.091*** 
(.027) 
-.042*** 
(.016) 
-.119*** 
(.026) 
At least 5 
years  
-.000 
(.019) 
-.091*** 
(.036) 
-.013 
(.018) 
-.131*** 
(.035) 
At least 6 
years 
-.000 
(.019) 
-.092* 
(.051) 
-.013 
(.018) 
-.143*** 
(.047) 
Sample size  138,234 138,234 138,234 138,234 
(# individuals) 48,217 48,217 48,217 48,217 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and estimated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test).  Women 24 to 45 years old strongly 
attached to the labor market. Results come from a first-difference specification with individual fixed 
effects, where the dependent variable is the one-year change in real hourly wages and controls are: 
WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in part-time work, the type of 
contract at t-1, age, year, province, education, level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the 
change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 
dummies, cohabiting status, and immigrant status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: industry, 
occupation, number of workers and public sector.  
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Table 9. B 
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty for Workers with Permanent Contract at 
time t-1, by Experience in Part-time Work 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
 Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Fixed-effects 
 (Worker controls + employer 
characteristics + change occupation or 
employer) 
 Marginal effects Cumulative 
effects 
Marginal effects Cumulative 
effects 
Number of consecutive years in part-time work if no change of employer the year of the switching
The year of 
switching 
+.030*** 
(.005) 
 +.029*** 
(.004) 
 
At least 1 
year  
-.079*** 
(.006) 
-.079*** 
(.006) 
-.079*** 
(.006) 
-.079*** 
(.006) 
At least 2 
years  
.010 
(.009) 
-.070*** 
(.013) 
.009 
(.009) 
-.071*** 
(.012) 
At least 3 
years 
.008 
(.011) 
-.062*** 
(.020) 
.009 
(.010) 
-.062*** 
(.020) 
At least 4 
years  
.020 
(.014) 
-.042 
(.029) 
.021 
(.013) 
-.042 
(.028) 
At least 5 
years  
.011 
(.014) 
-.031 
(.038) 
.013 
(.014) 
-.029 
(.038) 
At least 6 
years 
.011 
(.014) 
-.020 
(.050) 
.013 
(.014) 
-.017 
(.049) 
Number of consecutive years in part-time work if  change of employer the year of the switching 
The year of 
switching 
-.108*** 
(.006) 
 -.064*** 
(.006) 
 
At least 1 
year  
-.031*** 
(.007) 
-.031*** 
(.007) 
-.037*** 
(.006) 
-.037*** 
(.006) 
At least 2 
years  
.002 
(.008) 
-.029*** 
(.012) 
-.001 
(.008) 
-.039*** 
(.012) 
At least 3 
years 
-.011 
(.009) 
-.041** 
(.018) 
-.015 
(.009) 
-.054*** 
(.018) 
At least 4 
years  
.024** 
(.013) 
-.017 
(.026) 
.017 
(.012) 
-.038 
(.026) 
At least 5 
years  
.030** 
(.014) 
.012 
(.036) 
.023* 
(.014) 
-.015 
(.034) 
At least 6 
years 
.030** 
(.014) 
.043 
(.049) 
.023* 
(.014) 
.007 
(.047) 
Sample size  330,298 330,298 330,298 330,298 
(# individuals) 54,093 54,093 54,093 54,093 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and estimated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test).  Women 24 to 45 years old strongly 
attached to the labor market. Results come from a first-difference specification with individual fixed 
effects, where the dependent variable is the one-year change in real hourly wages and controls are: 
WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in part-time work, the type of 
contract at t-1, age, year, province, education, level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the 
change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 
dummies, cohabiting status, and immigrant status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: industry, 
occupation, number of workers and public sector.  
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APPENDIX 
(Not necessarily for publication) 
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Validation of the use of imputed hours 
We have conducted the following robustness test of the use of imputed hours.  Given 
that the difference between effective and contract hours is lower (for both PT and FT 
workers) among workers younger than 35 years old than for those older than 34 years 
old (as shown in Figure 2 in the main text), we have re-estimated the final specification 
separately for the two age groups.  If the switch from premium to penalty is the result 
of measurement error, we would expect to see a much larger difference between the 
biased and imputed results among the older sample (ages 35-44).  Appendix Table A.2 
shows this robustness test and confirms the validity of our correction.  Indeed, the 
difference between the biased and corrected estimates is considerably greater for the 
older sample than the younger one.  In addition, the difference in the correction of the 
measurement error between the older and the younger samples is greater among 
workers with fixed-term contract than those with permanent, which would be expected 
if employers have more leeway in under-reporting contractual hours among those in the 
secondary market.  
Re-estimation of the growth analysis using imputed wages 
In the growth analysis, an alternative correction for the differential measurement error 
in contractual hourly wages by PT status is to use imputed wages as we did in the levels 
analysis.  Panel B in Appendix Table A.3 shows the estimates from the growth analysis 
using imputed wages.  Our preferred estimates, FE with worker controls, are displayed 
in column 4 and show similar results to those found when the year of the change of PT 
status is dropped.  Indeed, we find that there is a statistically significant PT penalty in 
growth for both types of contracts, and that the PT penalty in growth is higher and 
statistically so for women with a fixed-term contract than for those with a permanent 
one.  In comparison, Panel A, which shows the growth estimates prior to applying any 
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correction for the differential measurement error by PT status, deliver considerably 
smaller coefficients (and not always statistically significant for workers with permanent 
contracts). 
Endogeneity into type of contract 
Because type of contract may also be endogenous, we have explored the robustness of 
our results by estimating a fixed-effects two-stage least squares estimator (FE-2SLS 
hereafter).  As instruments, we have tried two possible IVs, frequently used in Spain to 
correct for endogeneity by type of contract.  First, following De la Rica, 2007, we have 
estimated the rate of fixed-term contracts by year, province, industry and age groups.  
This IV has been estimated using the Spanish Labor Force Survey FOR YEARS 1996-
2006.50   Alternatively, following Barceló and Villanueva, 2010, we instrument the type 
of contract using regional variation in the amount, timing and target groups of subsidies 
given to firms to hire permanent workers (or convert fixed-term contracts into 
permanent ones).51   While we are aware of the potential issues with these two IVs, our 
purpose is not to claim that we solve the endogeneity problem per se, but instead to 
provide some robustness checks on our key findings.   
 Appendix Tables A.4 (level estimates) and A.5 (growth estimates) show our FE 
estimates and the two FE-2SLS estimates.  In Table A.4, we find that correcting for 
endogeneity by type of contract increases the PT penalty of workers with a fixed-term 
contract by one fourth (from -23 to -29 log points), while leaving it unchanged to 9 log 
points or reducing it to 6 log points (depending on which IV is used) for workers with 
                                                 
50 The estimate of the IV in the first stage FE equation is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
confidence level. 
51 The estimate of the IV in the first stage FE is positive and statistically significant at the 1% confidence 
level. 
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permanent contracts.52  Table A.4 shows a similar correction in terms of the wage 
growth.  These results suggest that there is some positive selection into fixed-term PT 
contracts, and that not correcting by such type of selection, underestimates the PT 
penalty among this segment of the labor force. The underlying rationale seems to be that 
among FT workers, those who work in temporary jobs are those of lower productivity.  
However, the opposite seems to hold for PT workers suggesting that those with a 
temporary contract are trapped in such work arrangements, whereas those with 
permanent contracts select into those types of jobs (as their job stability is guaranteed).   
Employer fixed-effects estimators  
In addition, we have re-estimated our preferred specifications using employer-worker 
match fixed- effects estimators (shown in Table A.6). The idea here is to rule out the 
possibility that our results are driven by the selection of PT workers into firms that pay 
lower or that have lower wage growth. On average we have 3.4 year observations for 
each of the 173,514 firm-worker matches.  We find that the PT penalty in levels 
decreases for workers in the secondary market, suggesting that workers with fixed-term 
contracts who switch to PT work are concentrated in low-paying employers.  In 
contrast, for workers in the primary labor market the opposite is observed, implying that 
workers with permanent contracts who switch to PT work are those who work in high-
paying employers.  The growth specification shows that in both cases, controlling for 
employer fixed effects increases the penalty, suggesting that workers are in firms with 
higher wage growth.  Notice however, that the main findings hold:  There is a PT 
penalty in levels and in growth that is aggravated for workers in the secondary labor 
market. 
  
                                                 
52 Note that a priori, it is unclear how the sign of the endogeneity bias would have affected the PT penalty 
as the relationship between unobserved heterogeneity and type of contract may differ across FT and PT 
status in the primary (permanent jobs) and secondary sector (temporary jobs). 
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Mothers versus non-mothers 
We have re-estimated our preferred specifications separately for mothers versus non-
mothers (shown in Appendix Table A.7).  If the results found thus far were mainly 
driven by mothers, then we could infer that the PT wage differential is more of a 
compensating differential for flexible work schedule than a penalty.  The underlying 
assumption here is that non mothers working PT do so mainly involuntarily.  Using the 
1999-2009 Labor Force Survey, we find evidence of this.  When restricting the sample 
to women 25 to 45 years old with no children in the household, we find that less than 
7% of those working PT reported doing so voluntarily because of family reasons, and as 
many as 70% reported doing so involuntarily (33% because they did not find a FT job 
and 37% because their job required them to do so). 53   
 Table A.7 shows that the main findings of the paper hold for both sub-samples.  
We find that women working PT have lower wages than those working FT, and that this 
wage differential is considerably greater for women with fixed-term contracts (than 
those with permanent contract).  These results hold regardless of whether women have 
children living in the household with them or not.  Similar results are found for the 
wage growth specification when women work with a fixed-term contract.  However, in 
the wage growth analysis, we find that the loss associated with PT work for women 
with permanent contracts is mainly driven by those without children, suggesting that for 
mothers no such penalty takes place.   
Omitted variable bias due to lack of information on non-labor income 
Unfortunately, the CSWH does not have information on non-labor income or spouse’s 
earnings.  This could generate an omitted variable bias that could be affecting the 
coefficients of interest.  To address this potential concern, we have re-estimated the 
                                                 
53  An additional, 14% of these women work PT voluntarily because they were studying or they were 
sick. 
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preferred specifications (both in levels and in growth) separately for women cohabiting 
with a male and those living alone (shown in Appendix Table A.8).  The estimates in 
Appendix Table A.8 show findings for each of the two samples consistent with those 
reported earlier in the paper, suggesting that the presence of a spouse in the household 
(and therefore of spouse’s earnings) does not seem to be affecting the main results of 
the paper.  
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Table 1.A.  
Estimation of the PT Penalty Fixed-Effects Estimation  
Dependent variable: Ln(real hourly wage) with imputed effective hours  
 Pooled OLS Individual Fixed-Effects 
 Whole 
sample 
Fixed-Term 
Contract 
Permanent 
Contract 
Whole 
sample 
Fixed-Term 
Contract 
Permanent 
Contract 
Part-Time -.232*** 
(.003) 
-.260*** 
(.004) 
-.191*** 
(.004) 
-.171*** 
(.001) 
-.213*** 
(.003) 
-.078*** 
(.002) 
Less than HS .. -.076*** 
(.004) 
-.138*** 
(.004) 
.. .. .. 
HS graduate .050*** 
(.002) 
-.045*** 
(.004) 
-.076*** 
(.004) 
.. .. .. 
More than HS .110*** 
(.003) 
.. .. .. .. .. 
Immigrant .000 
(.004) 
.016*** 
(.005) 
-.017*** 
(.006) 
.. .. .. 
Experience .015*** 
(.000) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.023*** 
(.000) 
.042*** 
(.001) 
.046*** 
(.002) 
.024*** 
(.001) 
Experience2 -.0003*** 
(.000) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
-.0005*** 
(.000) 
-.0009*** 
(.000) 
-.001*** 
(.000) 
-.0007*** 
(.000) 
Permanent 
contract 
.000 
(.002) 
.. .. .009*** 
(.001) 
.. .. 
With children -.026*** 
(.003) 
-.018*** 
(.004) 
-.032*** 
(.004) 
-.032*** 
(.003) 
-.014* 
(.008) 
-.025*** 
(.003) 
With baby(0-
6) 
.020*** 
(.003) 
.020*** 
(.004) 
.014*** 
(.004) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
.018*** 
(.006) 
-.008*** 
(.002) 
Tenure .006*** 
(.000) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.000) 
-.0009*** 
(.0002) 
-.015*** 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Firm size (# 
workers) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
.001*** 
(.000) 
Civil servant .155*** 
(.004) 
.196*** 
(.005) 
.153*** 
(.005) 
.139*** 
(.004) 
.150*** 
(.006) 
.069*** 
(.008) 
Change of 
employer 
-.016*** 
(.001) 
-.026*** 
(.002) 
-.006*** 
(.002) 
-.014*** 
(.001) 
-.028*** 
(.002) 
-.012*** 
(.001) 
Change of 
occupation 
-.048*** 
(.001) 
-.017*** 
(.002) 
-.089*** 
(.002) 
-.030*** 
(.001) 
.003 
(.002) 
-.072*** 
(.001) 
Intermittency -.196*** 
(.027) 
-.054** 
(.028) 
-.392*** 
(.046) 
.006 
(.020) 
-.136*** 
(.031) 
.313*** 
(.036) 
Intermittency2 .340*** 
(.058) 
.118** 
(.059) 
.402*** 
(.107) 
.037 
(.037) 
.212*** 
(.058) 
-.637*** 
(.064) 
Observations 591,063 194,218 396,845 591,063 194,218 396,845 
Individuals 77,815 53,693 60,139 77,815 53,693 60,139 
R2 .44 .35 .47 .37 .29 .32 
Age dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province dum YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ind. dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Occ. 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** Significant at 1% level. Imputed hours come from a regression of effectively worked hours against 
contractual hours, age, education, two-digit industry and occupation using the Spanish Time Use Survey 
Dataset. A negative number indicates a penalty for part-time workers. Each set of regressions has the 
following controls: UNADJUSTED – year and province dummies; WORKERS CONTROLS – age, 
education, nationality, province of residence, experience and quadratic of experience, tenure, dummies 
that indicate the presence in the household of children less than 6 years old, and a dummy indicator for 
immigrant status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS – number of workers, public sector dummy; 
INDUSTRY & OCCUPATION – two-digits industry dummies and ten occupation categories dummies;  
CHANGE OF EMPLOYER – a dummy indicating if the individual’s employer at year t is different from 
t-1. 
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Table A.2 
Estimation of the Part-Time 
Pay Penalty, Different 
methodologies 
The Effect of Imputing Effectively Worked Hours across Age Groups 
Dependent variable: Ln(real hourly wage) 
 
 Whole sample With fixed-term contract 
at time t 
With permanent contract 
at time t 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A. USING CONTRACTUAL HOURS TO CALCULATE HOURLY WAGES 
  
Panel A1. Young: aged 25-34 
Pooled OLS +.027*** 
(.003) 
+.027*** 
(.004) 
+.037*** 
(.004) 
Individual Fixed-
Effects 
+.083*** 
(.001) 
+.068*** 
(.003) 
+.131*** 
(.003) 
  
Panel A2. Old: aged 35-45 
Pooled OLS +.013*** 
(.005) 
+.011 
(.007) 
+.034*** 
(.007) 
Individual Fixed-
Effects 
+.079*** 
(.002) 
+.057*** 
(.005) 
+.119*** 
(.004) 
 
PANEL B. USING IMPUTED EFFECTIVE HOURS TO CALCULATE HOURLY WAGES
  
Panel B1. Young: aged 25-34 
Pooled OLS -.056*** 
(.003) 
-.083*** 
(.004) 
-.019*** 
(.005) 
Individual Fixed-
Effects 
+.001 
(.002) 
-.037*** 
(.003) 
+.094*** 
(.003) 
  
Panel B2. Old: aged 35-45 
Pooled OLS -.335*** 
(.006) 
-.376*** 
(.009) 
-.280*** 
(.008) 
Individual Fixed-
Effects 
-.258*** 
(.003) 
-.316*** 
(.006) 
-.161*** 
(.004) 
    
Sample size   591,063 194,218 396,845 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and calculated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). ? indicates that the difference of the estimated effects between the before 2001 and after 
2001 period is significant at the 10% level. UNADJUSTED: regressions control for year and province dummies. WORKER 
CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, immigrant status, 
year, province, education, level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number 
of children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, and cohabiting status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: 
industry, occupation, number of workers and public sector. 
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Table A.3  
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty 
Pooled OLS and Individual Fixed Effects Specifications 
Using Imputed Hours versus Using Contractual Hours to Calculate Hourly Wages 
Women 24 to 45 years old: CSWH 1996-2006 
 Pooled OLS 
(Unadjusted) 
Pooled OLS 
(Worker 
controls) 
Fixed-effects 
(Worker 
controls) 
Pooled OLS 
(+employer and 
occupation 
change) 
Fixed-effects 
(+employer and 
occupation 
change+intermit
tences) 
 (1) (2) (4) (11) (12) 
PANEL A. USING CONTRACTUAL HOURS TO COMPUTE HOURLY WAGES 
Panel A1. Without Contract Type 
 -.003** 
(.001) 
-.016*** 
(.002) 
-.013*** 
(.002) 
-.016*** 
(.002) 
-.013*** 
(.002) 
Panel A2. By Contract Type 
Fixed-term 
contract at 
time t 
-.014*** 
(.002) 
-.018*** 
(.002) 
-.018*** 
(.003) 
-.018*** 
(.002) 
-.016*** 
(.003) 
Permanent 
contract at 
time t 
+.004*? 
(.002) 
-.012*** 
(.003) 
-.004? 
(.004) 
-.011***? 
(.003) 
-.004? 
(.004) 
Sample size  506,322 506,322 506,322 
76,016 
506,322 506,322 
# Individuals 76,016 76,016 76,016 76,016 
 
PANEL B. USING IMPUTED EFFECTIVE HOURS TO COMPUTE HOURLY WAGES 
Panel B1. Without Contract Type
 -.051*** 
(.001) 
-.059*** 
(.002) 
-.062*** 
(.003) 
-.058*** 
(.002) 
-.059*** 
(.003) 
Panel B2. By Contract Type
Fixed-term 
contract at 
time t 
-.077*** 
(.002) 
-.073*** 
(.003) 
-.084*** 
(.003) 
-.073*** 
(.003) 
-.079*** 
(.003) 
Permanent 
contract at 
time t 
-.023***? 
(.002) 
-.026***? 
(.003) 
-.013***?  
(.004) 
-.025***? 
(.003) 
-.011*? 
(.004) 
Sample size  506,322 506,322 506,322 506,322 506,322 
# Individuals 76,016 76,016 76,016 76,016 76,016 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and calculated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). ? indicates that the difference of the 
estimated effects by type of contract is significant at the 10% level.  UNADJUSTED: regressions control 
for year and province dummies. WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive 
years in part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, immigrant status, year, province, education, level 
of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number of 
children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, and cohabiting status; EMPLOYER 
CHARACTERISTICS: occupation, number of workers and public sector. INDUSTRY: are two-digits 
industry dummies. INTERMITTENCIES: the number of years not working relative to the number of 
years of potential experience. Potential experience is calculated as the difference between the current 
year and the year of entry in the Social Security System.   
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Table A.4  
Estimation of the Part-Time Pay Penalty, FE-2SLS 
Dependent variable: Ln(real hourly wage) 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
 
 Unadjusted  Worker controls 
 
Worker controls + employer 
characteristics + change 
occupation or employer + 
intermittencies 
Panel A:  With fixed-term contracts (number of observations: 194,218) 
 Fixed-   effects -.237*** 
(.003) 
-.230*** 
(.003) 
-.213*** 
(.003) 
FE- 2SLS 
(De la Rica, 2007) 
 
-.316*** 
(.004) 
 
-.285*** 
(.004) 
 
-.270*** 
(.004) 
 
FE- 2SLS 
(BV, 2010) 
 
-.312*** 
(.005) 
 
-.287*** 
(.005) 
-.272*** 
(.005) 
Panel C:  With permanent contracts (number of observations: 396,845) 
 Fixed-   
     Effects 
-.095*** 
(.003) 
-.087*** 
(.003) 
-.078*** 
(.002) 
 
FE- 2SLS 
(De la Rica, 2007) 
 
-.080*** 
(.003) 
 
-.091*** 
(.003) 
 
-.075*** 
(.003) 
 
 FE- 2SLS 
(BV, 2010) 
 
-.058*** 
(.005) 
 
-.062*** 
(.005) 
 
-.048*** 
(.005) 
*** Significant at 1% level. A negative number indicates a penalty for part-time workers. Each set of regressions has the 
following controls: UNADJUSTED – year and province dummies; WORKERS CONTROLS – age, education, nationality, 
province of residence, experience and quadratic of experience, tenure, dummies that indicate the presence in the household of 
children and of children less than 6 years old, and a dummy indicator for immigrant status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS – 
number of workers, public sector dummy; INDUSTRY & OCCUPATION – two-digits industry dummies and ten occupation 
categories dummies;  CHANGE OF EMPLOYER – a dummy indicating if the individual’s employer at year t is different from t-
1; INTERMITTENCIES: the number of years not working relative to the number of years of potential experience. Potential 
experience is calculated as the difference between the current year and the year of entry in the Social Security System. 
2SLS: in the first step, the type of contract at year t is regressed against the set of worker and employer controls, province and 
year dummies and the level of unemployment and GDP growth at the province level, and the IV.  The first IV is the rate of fixed-
term contracts by year, province, industry and age groups.  While the second IV is the monetary subsidy for the conversion of a 
fixed-term contract into a permanent one according to age, year, region and gender of the individual.  In the first step regression, 
the coefficient of the IV was positive and significant at the 1% confidence level.  
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Table A.5  
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty 
FE - 2SLS 
Women 24 to 45 years old: CSWH 1996-2006 
Covariates Unadjusted Worker controls (+employer and occupation 
change+intermittencies) 
 Fixed-
Effects  
FE-2SLS  
(De la Rica, 
2007) 
FE-2SLS  
(BV, 2010) 
Fixed-effects 
 
FE-2SLS 
(De la Rica, 
2007) 
FE-2SLS  
(BV, 2010) 
Fixed-effects 
 
FE-2SLS 
(De la Rica, 
2007) 
FE-2SLS  
(BV, 2010) 
 (3) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10) (9) (10) 
Fixed-term 
contract at time 
t 
-.032*** 
(.003) 
-.042*** 
(.007) 
-.051*** 
(.010) 
-.039*** 
(.005) 
-.045*** 
(.008) 
-.049*** 
(.010) 
-.037*** 
(.005) 
-.041*** 
(.008) 
-.045*** 
(.010) 
Permanent 
contract at time 
t 
-.034*** 
(.002) 
-.014*** 
(.005) 
-.011? 
(.007) 
-.029***? 
(.005) 
-.021***? 
(.008) 
-.023**? 
(.011) 
-.027***? 
(.005) 
-.020***? 
(.008) 
-.019*? 
(.011) 
Hourly earnings have been deflated using 2006 deflator and calculated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). ? 
indicates that the difference of the estimated effects by type of contract is significant at the 10% level.  UNADJUSTED: regressions control for year and province dummies. 
WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, immigrant status, year, province, education, 
level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, and 
cohabiting status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: occupation, number of workers and public sector. INDUSTRY: are two-digits industry dummies. 
INTERMITTENCIES: the number of years not working relative to the number of years of potential experience. Potential experience is calculated as the difference between 
the current year and the year of entry in the Social Security System.  .  
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Table A.6 
The Part-time Wage Penalty 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
Individuals’ FE versus Individuals and Employers’ FE 
 
 LEVELS ANALYSIS♣ GROWTH ANALYSIS? 
 Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls + employer 
characteristics+ industry) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls + employer characteristics+ 
industry) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A. Without contract type
FE -.187*** 
(.001) 
-.171*** 
(.001) 
-.038*** 
(.004) 
-.034*** 
(.004) 
Individual and employer FE -.127*** 
(.002) 
-.114*** 
(.002) 
-.055*** 
(.006) 
-.056*** 
(.006) 
 Panel B. By contract type
 Fixed-term contract at time t 
FE -.287*** 
(.005) 
-.272*** 
(.005) 
-.039*** 
(.005) 
-.036*** 
(.005) 
Individual and employer FE -.149*** 
(.003) 
-.141*** 
(.003) 
-.069*** 
(.007) 
-.068*** 
(.007) 
 Permanent contract at time t 
FE -.062*** 
(.005) 
-.048*** 
(.005) 
-.029***? 
(.005) 
-.026***? 
(.005) 
Individual and employer FE -.105*** 
(.002) 
-.089*** 
(.089) 
-.043***? 
(.007) 
-.044***? 
(.007) 
Sample size  591,063 591,063 468,532 468,532 
 (# individuals) 77,815 77,815 75,063 75,063 
(# of firm-individual matches) 173,514  131,712 131,712 
♣Specification that uses imputed effective hours to calculate hourly wages.  ?Specification that uses contractWhmaiual hours to compute hourly wages and drops observations of the year of switching. Hourly earnings 
have been deflated using 2006 deflator and calculated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). ? indicates that the difference of the estimated effects between 
women with and without children is significant at the 10% level. UNADJUSTED: regressions control for year and province dummies. WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in 
part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, immigrant status, year, province, education, level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with 
children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, and cohabiting status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: industry, occupation, number of workers and public sector.  
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Table A.7 
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
Mothers versus Women without Children 
 
 LEVELS ANALYSIS♣ GROWTH ANALYSIS? 
 Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls + employer 
characteristics+ industry) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls + employer characteristics+ 
industry) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A. Without contract type
Women without children -.192*** 
(.002) 
-.176*** 
(.002) 
-.045*** 
(.004) 
-.041*** 
(.004) 
Women with children -.174***? 
(.003) 
-.157***? 
(.003) 
-.015*? 
(.008) 
-.013?
(.008) 
 Panel B. By contract type
 Fixed-term contract at time t 
Women without children -.226*** 
(.003) 
-.210*** 
(.003) 
-.044*** 
(.006) 
-.038*** 
(.006) 
Women with children -.245***? 
(.007) 
-.224***? 
(.006) 
-.024** 
(.011) 
-.023** 
(.011) 
 Permanent contract at time t 
Women without children -.081*** 
(.003) 
-.072*** 
(.003) 
-.038*** 
(.006) 
-.038*** 
(.006) 
Women with children -.096***? 
(.004) 
-.087***? 
(.004) 
.001?
(.010) 
.001? 
(.010) 
Sample size  591,063 591,063 468,532 468,532 
     With children 133,002 (22.5%) 133,002 (22.5%) 105,482 (22.5%) 105,482 (22.5%) 
 (# individuals) 77,815 77,815 75,063 75,063 
     With children 26,312 (33.8%) 26,312 (33.8%) 24,627 (32.8%) 24,627 (32.8%) 
♣Specification that uses imputed effective hours to calculate hourly wages.  ?Specification that uses contractual hours to compute hourly wages and drops observations of the year of switching. Hourly earnings have 
been deflated using 2006 deflator and calculated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). ? indicates that the difference of the estimated effects between 
women with and without children is significant at the 10% level. UNADJUSTED: regressions control for year and province dummies. WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in 
part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, immigrant status, year, province, education, level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with 
children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, and cohabiting status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: industry, occupation, number of workers and public sector.  
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Table A.8 
The Part-time Wage Growth Penalty 
Women 24 to 45 years old 
Women Cohabiting and Lone Women 
 
 LEVELS ANALYSIS♣ GROWTH ANALYSIS? 
 Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls + employer 
characteristics+ industry) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls) 
Individual Fixed-effects 
(Worker controls + employer characteristics+ 
industry) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A. Without contract type
Cohabiting women -.187*** 
(.002) 
-.171*** 
(.003) 
-.036*** 
(.004) 
-.033*** 
(.004) 
Lone women -.186*** 
(.004) 
-.171*** 
(.004) 
-.044*** 
(.008) 
-.042***
(.008) 
 Panel B. By contract type
 Fixed-term contract at time t 
Cohabiting women -.232*** 
(.003) 
-.214*** 
(.003) 
-.038*** 
(.005) 
-.035*** 
(.005) 
Lone women -.218***? 
(.007) 
-.205*** 
(.007) 
-.042*** 
(.011) 
-.041*** 
(.010) 
 Permanent contract at time t 
Cohabiting women -.085*** 
(.003) 
-.077*** 
(.003) 
-.028*** 
(.005) 
-.025*** 
(.003) 
Lone women -.098*** 
(.007) 
-.085*** 
(.007) 
-.037***
(.010) 
-.037*** 
(.010) 
Sample size  591,063 591,063 468,532 468,532 
     Cohabiting 479,694 (81.2%) 479,694 (81.2%) 379,796 (81.1%) 379,796 (81.1%) 
 (# individuals) 77,815 77,815 75,063 75,063 
     Cohabiting 63,301 (81.3%) 63,301 (81.3%) 60,949 (81.2%) 60,949 (81.2%) 
♣Specification that uses imputed effective hours to calculate hourly wages.  ?Specification that uses contractual hours to compute hourly wages and drops observations of the year of switching. Hourly earnings have 
been deflated using 2006 deflator and calculated with contractual hours.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided test). ? indicates that the difference of the estimated effects between 
women with and without children is significant at the 10% level. UNADJUSTED: regressions control for year and province dummies. WORKER CONTROLS: part-time status, the number of consecutive years in 
part-time work, the type of contract at t-1, age, immigrant status, year, province, education, level of experience in part-time and full-time jobs, the change in the level of experience, tenure, number of children, with 
children less than 3 and bigger than 6 dummies, and cohabiting status; EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS: industry, occupation, number of workers and public sector.  
 
